On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have defined >>>> it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the definition of Undecidability ia based on there being a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent answer, just not one that can be determined by a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have _no_ >>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent answer, not just one that can be known by not >>>>>>>>>>>>> computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same input >>>>>>>>>>>> as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject some >>>>>>>>>>>> input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to put >>>>>>>>>>> the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the Nth >>>>>>>>>>> digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the diagonal >>>>>>>>> because of the paradox that ensues when naively running the >>>>>>>>> classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a number >>>>>>>> that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you can >>>>>>>> use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across circle-
free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined at the
bottom of p246
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have defined >>>>> it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the definition of Undecidability ia based on there being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent answer, just not one that can be determined by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject some >>>>>>>>>>>>> input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to put >>>>>>>>>>>> the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the Nth >>>>>>>>>>>> digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the
diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively
running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a
number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across circle-
free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined at the
bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the
diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
defined
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined
at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string transformations
to decide that DD does in fact halt
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>>
defined
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/ >>>>> A machine is not a "diagonal".
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language
(b) Semantically incoherent relations between finite strings.
All self-reference "paradox" is merely (b)
On 5/8/26 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>>>
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/ >>>>>> A machine is not a "diagonal".
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language
we know DD halts polcott, so clearly not outside the body of knowledge
that can be expressed in language
(b) Semantically incoherent relations between finite strings.
All self-reference "paradox" is merely (b)
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the
diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
defined
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined
at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string transformations
to decide that DD does in fact halt
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have defined >>>>> it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the definition of Undecidability ia based on there being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent answer, just not one that can be determined by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject some >>>>>>>>>>>>> input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to put >>>>>>>>>>>> the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the Nth >>>>>>>>>>>> digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the
diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively
running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a
number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across circle-
free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined at the
bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
On 08/05/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known?
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. An >>>>>>>>>>>>>> universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some input >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt.
dunno what ur saying here.
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor digit >>>>>>>>>>>> positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the
diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>
machine to compute turing's diagonal,
defined
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, defined
at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
That "everything else" includes many thigns that would be useful to
know. In particular, whether some useful function can be computed is
in that "everything else".
On 5/9/2026 3:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 08/05/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct.
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic halting problem) involves a situations that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be known by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free machine... >>>>>>>>>>>>>That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>>
defined
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable numbers/ >>>>> A machine is not a "diagonal".
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
That "everything else" includes many thigns that would be useful to
know. In particular, whether some useful function can be computed is
in that "everything else".
Like the truth value of: "This sentence is not true"
that has no truth value.
All self-reference "paradox" is equivalent to the
Liar Paradox and can be resolved by disallowing it
like ZFC disallowed Russell's "Paradox".
On 05/10/2026 12:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 09/05/2026 15:13, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2026 3:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 08/05/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
No, but that measn that for some sentences X True(X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unknown and there
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic Incoherence, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the definition of Undecidability ia based on there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being a coherent answer, just not one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if you >>>>>>>>>>>>> can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>>>>
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable
numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
That "everything else" includes many thigns that would be useful to
know. In particular, whether some useful function can be computed is
in that "everything else".
Like the truth value of: "This sentence is not true"
that has no truth value.
I don't think knowing the truth value of that would be useful. At least
not for any important purpose.
All self-reference "paradox" is equivalent to the
Liar Paradox and can be resolved by disallowing it
like ZFC disallowed Russell's "Paradox".
Whether something is a self-reference depends on interpretation. In an
uninterpreted formal language there are no references and therefore no
self-references, which is the simplest way to avoid paradoxes by self-
reference.
Even without any self-reference a theory can be inconsistent. Russell's
paradox is simply an inconsistency.
Another way to look at that quantification over finitely-many elements
brings another one, is providing "increment" or "successor" as a
natural fact of quantification instead of it being "defined" as
what later gives a model of Peano (or Presburger) arithmetic,
though that those are really only models of ordinals, since
integers themselves have the integral moduli.
So, one way to look at that is that Russell's "paradox" or really
any account of quantification over what would make numbers
illustrates that numbers make more numbers.
That quantifying over numbers brings more numbers is just a fact
that numbers have and that the action does - then for somebody
like Mirimanoff who simply notes that after the "ordinary",
i.e. as by the finite ordinals, is the "extra-ordinary',
yet, "Russell's paradox" can start with an empty set and
find another one, that contains itself.
So, you either make for freedom of expansion of comprehension,
and numbers aren't paradoxical, or you don't.
Many keep the account simple with "there's no infinite".
Here though that's considered retro-finitism after
something like "Russell's retro-thesis" and ignorant.
On 5/8/2026 1:40 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote:
No, but that measn that for some sentences X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(X) is unknown and there
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incoherence, as the definition of Undecidability ia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on there being a coherent answer, just not one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be determined by a computation.
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing machines. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An universalTuring machine halts with some inputs and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language.
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle-free >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if >>>>>>>>>>>>> you can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But it is >>>>>>>>>>
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable
numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language
we know DD halts polcott, so clearly not outside the body of knowledge
that can be expressed in language
No it is fucked up bullshit like:
"This sentence is not true" (see b below)
(b) Semantically incoherent relations between finite strings.
All self-reference "paradox" is merely (b)
On 5/8/26 12:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 1:40 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, but that measn that for some sentences X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(X) is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether
or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incoherence, as the definition of Undecidability ia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on there being a coherent answer, just not one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be determined by a computation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machines. An universalTuring machine halts with some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inputs and doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the Nth digit on this diagonal across all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> circle-free machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But >>>>>>>>>>>> it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable >>>>>>>>> numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language
we know DD halts polcott, so clearly not outside the body of
knowledge that can be expressed in language
No it is fucked up bullshit like:
"This sentence is not true" (see b below)
are you saying u don't understand that DD maps to the semantic property
of "halting" polcott??
On 5/8/26 12:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 1:40 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, but that measn that for some sentences X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(X) is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether
or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incoherence, as the definition of Undecidability ia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on there being a coherent answer, just not one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be determined by a computation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machines. An universalTuring machine halts with some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inputs and doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> free machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But >>>>>>>>>>>> it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable >>>>>>>>> numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language
we know DD halts polcott, so clearly not outside the body of
knowledge that can be expressed in language
No it is fucked up bullshit like:
"This sentence is not true" (see b below)
are you saying u don't understand that DD maps to the semantic property
of "halting" polcott??
(b) Semantically incoherent relations between finite strings.
All self-reference "paradox" is merely (b)
dart200 wrote:^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
On 5/8/26 12:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 1:40 PM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 10:35 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 12:13 PM, dart200 wrote:we know DD halts polcott, so clearly not outside the body of
On 5/8/26 9:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable >>>>>>>>>> numbers/
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you >>>>>>>>>>> have defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, but that measn that for some sentences X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(X) is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians and logicians don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether
or not its truth value is known an ambiguous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> question.
I needed to refer to unknown truth values >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specifically
because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incoherence, as the definition of Undecidability ia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on there being a coherent answer, just not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one that can be determined by a computation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machines. An universalTuring machine halts with some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inputs and doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> free machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total
dovetailing machine to compute turing's diagonal,
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,. >>>>>>>>>
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across >>>>>>>> circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper, >>>>>>>> defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
i believe the i mentally applied a finite set of string
transformations to decide that DD does in fact halt
No one every simplified is down to its barest possible
essence before me. Also the entire body of knowledge
expressed in language can be encoded as finite relations
between finite strings.
This transforms all undecidability into
(a) Outside of the body of knowledge that can be expressed in language >>>>
knowledge that can be expressed in language
No it is fucked up bullshit like:
"This sentence is not true" (see b below)
are you saying u don't understand that DD maps to the semantic
property of "halting" polcott??
No I'm saying
that M/RR changes by any small movement of a pebble within
the earth's makeup. There are millions of vehicles driving around on the earth's surface altering the calculation. What's there to pinpointing G?
What's next, setting down an ice-cold coca-cola and marveling at
different temperature readings upon it?
On 10/05/2026 22:06, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2026 2:10 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 09/05/2026 15:13, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2026 3:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 08/05/2026 19:58, olcott wrote:
On 5/8/2026 11:06 AM, dart200 wrote:
On 5/8/26 12:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 07/05/2026 12:00, dart200 wrote:
On 5/7/26 12:18 AM, Mikko wrote:A machine is not a "diagonal".
On 06/05/2026 22:40, dart200 wrote:
On 5/6/26 12:55 AM, Mikko wrote:You should not say anything about the diagonal before you have >>>>>>>>>> defined
On 05/05/2026 12:28, dart200 wrote:
On 5/5/26 1:25 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/05/2026 10:53, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 11:15 PM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/05/2026 12:09, dart200 wrote:
On 5/3/26 12:53 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/05/2026 23:39, dart200 wrote:dunno what ur saying here.
On 4/19/26 10:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/26 1:21 PM, olcott wrote:
richard richard richard, that is in-correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 4/19/2026 3:59 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 18/04/2026 15:58, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Unknown truths are not elements of the body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a semantic tautology. Did you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that things that are unknown are known? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, but that measn that for some sentences X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(X) is unknown and there
is no method to find out.
I don't know about philosophers but mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and logicians don't
find it interesting if all you can say that all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is knowable
and everything else is not.
Ross Finlayson, seemed to endlessly hedge on whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or not the truth value of the Goldbach conjecture was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known. He seemed to think that there are alternative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analytical frameworks that make the question of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether
or not its truth value is known an ambiguous question. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I needed to refer to unknown truth values specifically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because all "undecidability" when construed correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> falls into one of two categories.
(a) Semantic incoherence
(b) Unknown truth values.
Nope.
Undecidability can not come from Semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incoherence, as the definition of Undecidability ia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on there being a coherent answer, just not one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that can be determined by a computation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the undecidable problem turing described (as well as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the basic halting problem) involves a situations that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have _no_ coherent answer, not just one that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known by not computed ...
Turing proved that there are universal Turing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> machines. An universalTuring machine halts with some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inputs and doesn't halt with any other
input. Every Turing machine that can be given the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input as an
universal Turing machine either fails to accept some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input with which
that universal Turing machine halts or fails to reject >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some input with
which that universal Turing macnie does not halt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is a way to find out if you can read.
i can't read if u can't explain
I can't explain the art of reading Common Language. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
inturing hypothesized a diagonal computation that tries >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to put the Nth digit from the Nth circle-free machine >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as the Nth digit on this diagonal across all circle- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> free machine...
That is possible because there nither the machines nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> digit positions
are more numerous than natural numbers.
yes, but then he argues it's impossible to compute the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> diagonal because of the paradox that ensues when naively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> running the classifier on the diagonal itself
It is impossible to have a Turing machine that computes a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> number that
no Turing machine can compute. But you can compute it if >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you can use
all (infinitely many) Turing machines.
no you can't.
Hard to test as I han't infinite many Turing machines. But >>>>>>>>>>>> it is
u don't need to test it, you can't define a total dovetailing >>>>>>>>>>> machine to compute turing's diagonal,
it. Any use of the word before the definition is nonsense,.
the H machine defined on p247 from his paper /on computable >>>>>>>>> numbers/
the machine supposes to compute the "turing's diagonal" across
circle- free sequences, otherwise labeled as β' in the paper,
defined at the bottom of p246
Anything that any machine can possibly compute can
be computed by applying a finite set of finite string
transformation rules to a finite set of finite strings.
Everything else is simply out-of-scope for computation
like making a silk purse from a sow's ear.
That "everything else" includes many thigns that would be useful to
know. In particular, whether some useful function can be computed is >>>>> in that "everything else".
Like the truth value of: "This sentence is not true"
that has no truth value.
I don't think knowing the truth value of that would be useful. At least
not for any important purpose.
Knowing that all undecidability is merely semantic
incoherence enables:
"true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
to be reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
We don't have the knowledge that all undecidability is merely semantic incoherence, and can't know because we already know that there is undecidability that is not semantic incoherence. FOr example the
axiom system
∀x (1⋅x = x)
∀x (x⋅1 = x)
∀x∀y∀z (x⋅(y⋅z) = (x⋅y)⋅z)
∀x∃y (x⋅y = 1)
∀x∃y (y⋅x = 1)
is useful for many purposes. But there are sentences like
∀x∃y (x⋅y = y⋅x)
that are undecidable in that system. But there is notiong semantically incoherent in that example or similar ones.
The truth about climate change and election fraud could
be computed.
Not without real world information.
Of course you may postulate that
the climate is immutable or that there was massimbe undetected fraud
in the last or some earlier election but that is not what the word "knowledge" means.
LLMs could become reliable truth tellers.
They don't became other than what they are made to be. IF truthfullness
is not a design crterion it will not be a feature.
All self-reference "paradox" is equivalent to the
Liar Paradox and can be resolved by disallowing it
like ZFC disallowed Russell's "Paradox".
Whether something is a self-reference depends on interpretation. In an
uninterpreted formal language there are no references and therefore no
self-references, which is the simplest way to avoid paradoxes by self-
reference.
Even without any self-reference a theory can be inconsistent.
Russell's paradox is simply an inconsistency.
Likewise with all undecidability within the body
of knowledge that can be expressed as language.
No, per definition an inconcistency is decidable so it is not an undecidability.
RP is merely the only instance of pathological
self-reference (PSR) that was correctly rejected.
Russell's paradox is not an undecidability.
HP counter-example input is another instance of PSR.
The halting problem counter-example is neither an undecidability nor an incconsistency.
And there is no self-reference in it. The halting
problem counter-example is simply a Turing machine. A Truring machine
cannot contain any reference to any Turing machine so it cannot contain
a self-reference. A Turing machine is not and does not contain any claim
so it is not and does not contain any undecidability or inconsistency.
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