From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

On 23/06/2026 17:40, olcott wrote:

On 6/23/2026 12:49 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 22/06/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:

On 6/22/2026 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 22/06/2026 03:44, olcott wrote:

On 6/21/2026 7:32 PM, phoenix wrote:

olcott wrote:

On 6/21/2026 5:36 PM, phoenix wrote:

olcott wrote:

On 6/21/2026 3:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2026-06-20 04:26, Alan Mackenzie wrote:

Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> wrote:

On 19/06/2026 23:28, Alan Mackenzie wrote:

In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:

On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:

https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
Making sure to leave out

Proof-theoretic semantics
(an alternative to truth-condition semantics) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/

Some people only memorize conventional views and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject alternative views out-of-hand without review. >>>>>>>>>>>

Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject
alternative views out-of-hand without review.

Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> look into proof theoretic semantics.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>

I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page.  It is >>>>>>>>>>>>> abstract in
the extreme.  One thing is utterly clear: its level of >>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction is
well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter Olcott, >>>>>>>>>>>>> who can't
even understand proof by contradiction.

That page's level of abstraction is high enough that I >>>>>>>>>>>>> can't be bothered
to read it any further.  If it actually says anything at >>>>>>>>>>>>> all, that
something is heavily disguised.  From it's "Conclusion and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Outlook"
section at the end:

| Standard proof-theoretic semantics has practically >>>>>>>>>>>>> exclusively been
| occupied with logical constants. Logical constants play a >>>>>>>>>>>>> central role
| in reasoning and inference, but are definitely not the >>>>>>>>>>>>> exclusive, and
| perhaps not even the most typical sort of entities that >>>>>>>>>>>>> can be defined
| inferentially. A framework is needed that deals with >>>>>>>>>>>>> inferential
| definitions in a wider sense and covers both logical and >>>>>>>>>>>>> extra- logical
| inferential definitions alike.

Does this have any meaning?

Yes. It means that proof-theoretic semantics is currently >>>>>>>>>>>> and in the
near future not useful as making it useful requires much >>>>>>>>>>>> time and
effort if it is possible at all.

Do its proponents have any idea what PTS ought to be useful >>>>>>>>>>> for? What it
ought to be able to do that standard logic fails at?  Maybe >>>>>>>>>>> André could
elucidate.  He seems to have a better grasp of it than >>>>>>>>>>> anybody else here.

I doubt my understanding of PTS is any better than yours. I >>>>>>>>>> basically only know what is presented in the Stanford
Encyclopedia article (which you correctly point out is not >>>>>>>>>> exactly aimed at beginners) and the Wikipedia article. What I >>>>>>>>>> am quite certain of, however, is that Olcott lacks any
understanding of what PTS actually says as he's made a variety >>>>>>>>>> of fairly absurd claims regarding it (for example, that PTS >>>>>>>>>> claims that unproven propositions are 'meaningless' or that >>>>>>>>>> the goal of PTS is to completely overthrow standard truth- >>>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics).

André

   Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to
   truth-condition semantics. It is based on the
   fundamental assumption that the central notion
   in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain
   expressions of our language, in particular to
   logical constants, is that of proof rather than
   truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics
   is semantics in terms of proof.
   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>
In other words it answers the question:
What happens when truth conditional semantics is
utterly abandoned and is totally replaced by proof
theoretic semantics?

Lastly, and why should we care? Please answer this and other
questions presented.

This is the key element to creating the algorithm
that divides truth was well-crafted lies in real time.

We can make these lies look foolish at every language
level from below average kindergarten to profoundly
brilliant genius with a PhD in everything and we
can do this before the liar finishes saying their
sentence.

It also make the trillion dollar LLM industry more
than 100-fold more valuable.

What good does it do to program the LLMs to never admit defeat?

It is not that they never admit defeat.
It is that that have a system of essentially infallible reasoning
that never errs as long as it has all the relevant information.

It is fairly simple to build a system of essentially infallible
reasoning that never errs even when it doesn't have all the
relevant information. The real problem is to construct a system
that tells something interesting instead of just different
presentations of the same already known facts.

It will have the exhaustively complete list of
every atomic fact of general knowledge of the
actual world.

That is impossible. By the time you have all facts of general knowledge
in your system the general knowledge has grown to inlude more facts.

It can be reasonably approximated pretty quickly.
We start with all of the textbooks.

That is a lot of reading, though those for the same topic area tend
to say the same, and the old ones add very little to the new ones,
mainly some now obsolete technology.
--
Mikko

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From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

On 24/06/2026 23:19, olcott wrote:

On 6/24/2026 3:23 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 23/06/2026 17:29, olcott wrote:

On 6/23/2026 12:39 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 22/06/2026 16:13, olcott wrote:

On 6/22/2026 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 22/06/2026 02:51, olcott wrote:

On 6/21/2026 4:57 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 20/06/2026 23:03, olcott wrote:

On 6/20/2026 2:17 PM, dbush wrote:

On 6/20/2026 3:02 PM, olcott wrote:

On 6/20/2026 12:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:

On 2026-06-19 20:40, olcott wrote:

On 6/19/2026 3:28 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:

[ Followup-To: set ]

In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/19/2026 2:23 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 18/06/2026 22:35, olcott wrote:

On 6/17/2026 4:14 PM, olcott wrote:

https://www.youtube.com/@rossfinlayson
Making sure to leave out

Proof-theoretic semantics
(an alternative to truth-condition semantics) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/

Some people only memorize conventional views and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject alternative views out-of-hand without review. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Whereas you are stuck to your own incoherent views and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reject
alternative views out-of-hand without review.

Calling my views (anchored in proof theoretic semantics) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent merely proves that you are too damned lazy to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look into proof theoretic semantics.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/

I've spent a couple of hours reading that web page.  It is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstract in
the extreme.  One thing is utterly clear: its level of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction is
well beyond the comprehension capabilities of Peter >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott, who can't
even understand proof by contradiction.

What superficially looks like contradiction
"This sentence is not true"

Once again, you're responding to people's posts with
irrelevancy.

The Liar's Paradox has absolutely nothing to do with proof >>>>>>>>>>>> by contradiction. The LP isn't a contradiction; it's a >>>>>>>>>>>> paradox. The two are different things. A contradiction is a >>>>>>>>>>>> statement which is necessarily false. A paradox is a
statement to which no truth value can be consistently assigned. >>>>>>>>>>>>
André

Then I have never spoken of anything where proof by
contradiction applies,

False, as that is exactly the method uses by the halting
problem proof, Godel's proof, and Tarski's proof, each of >>>>>>>>>> which you've been attempting (and failing) to refute for years. >>>>>>>>>>

Proof Theoretic Semantics halt prover HHH correctly determines >>>>>>>>> that its input DD is ungrounded in its atomic base according >>>>>>>>> to the operational semantics of the C programming language.

That only means that your DD is not a strictly confoming C program. >>>>>>>

The exact operational semantics of C conclusively
prove that the input DD to HHH is ungrounded in
these operational semantics because this input
specifies non-terminating recursive simulation
to HHH.

Because DD is not strictly conforming the exact operational semantics >>>>>> do not fully specify the behaviour of DD. In order to prove that DD >>>>>> halts you also need additional operational spemantics provided by the >>>>>> C implementation you have used. When DD iss executed in that
environment
it halts, which is sufficient to prove that in that environment DD >>>>>> halts. In some other environment its execution might be aborted or it >>>>>> could be rejected by the compiler.

Proof Theoretic Semantics provides the correct way
to handle pathological self-reference (PSR).

This would be dead obvious if you were not totally
clueless about Prolog.

% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

Nice to see that you don't disagree.

Not nice to see that everyone continues to
totally ignore my best validation of proof
theoretic semantics.

Unfortunately that is unavoidable as long as your best presentation
of the validation and of your version of proof theoretic semantics
are not good enough.

Is is dead obvious and completely clear example
of the final resolution of the Liar Paradox using
generic proof theoretic semantics implemented in
Prolog.

Except that it is not final -- others will continue presenting
different views about it -- and not even a resolution.

Anyway, nice to see that you still don't disabree.

This is understandable for anyone that has no
idea what a directed graph is.

Your understanding of understandability is far from the real thing.

This has been completely rewritten just now.
https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/README.md

The description is updated. The described is not updated.

It always was a proof theoretic halt prover
I just didn't have those terms until recently.

It is not a prover. It does not prove.

It proves that no canonical proof of DD reaching
its own final halt state exists within the operational
semantics of the C programming language for PTS halt
prover HHH.

Irrelevant. That DD halts when executed is sufficient for a reasonable
person to conclude that it halts. To formulate that inference as a
formal proof is trivial to anyone who knows the formal rules.

It produces some execution trace
but may end before termination, and presents its conclusion or crashes.

Perhaps you have no idea what cycles in directed graphs are?

Doesn't really matter, especially when they are not even mentioned.
The words are well known and the definitions can be found on the
web.
--
Mikko
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