• Re: Readings in (some of the) foundations of mathematics --- tree ofknowledge

    From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Wed Jun 24 15:26:52 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean you're >>>>>>>>>>> capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931
    incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or understanding >>>>>>>>> of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS somehow >>>>>>>>> causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert
    who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you
    certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor any >>>>>>>>> proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand
    what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used only by >>>>>>> you, and it is one which you have never explicitly defined, so
    the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly
    not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even adequately explained >>>>>>> what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a tree of >>>>>> semantic relations specified syntactically between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?


    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.math,comp.ai.philosophy on Thu Jun 25 10:21:49 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean you're >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931
    incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or understanding >>>>>>>>>> of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS
    somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you
    certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor any >>>>>>>>>> proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand
    what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used only >>>>>>>> by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly defined, >>>>>>>> so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. It's
    certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even adequately >>>>>>>> explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a tree of >>>>>>> semantic relations specified syntactically between finite strings. >>>>>>
    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be structured as >>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.lang,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Thu Jun 25 11:14:50 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean you're >>>>>>>>>>>>> capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or
    understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor >>>>>>>>>>> any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand
    what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used only >>>>>>>>> by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly defined, >>>>>>>>> so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. It's
    certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even
    adequately explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a tree >>>>>>>> of semantic relations specified syntactically between finite
    strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be structured as >>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.


    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From Mikko@mikko.levanto@iki.fi to comp.theory,sci.logic,sci.lang,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 09:39:59 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or
    understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor >>>>>>>>>>>> any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand
    what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used only >>>>>>>>>> by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly defined, >>>>>>>>>> so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. It's
    certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even
    adequately explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a tree >>>>>>>>> of semantic relations specified syntactically between finite >>>>>>>>> strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be structured as >>>>>>>> a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.
    --
    Mikko
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 08:10:34 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or
    understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor >>>>>>>>>>>>> any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand
    what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used >>>>>>>>>>> only by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. >>>>>>>>>>> It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even >>>>>>>>>>> adequately explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a tree >>>>>>>>>> of semantic relations specified syntactically between finite >>>>>>>>>> strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be
    structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is exressed in >>>>>>>>> some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to >>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    This is the same sort of thing as finding the defined
    meaning of a word. If you cannot find its recursively
    defined meaning then it never gains any meaning.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 09:20:31 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself nor >>>>>>>>>>>>>> any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded
    in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used >>>>>>>>>>>> only by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even >>>>>>>>>>>> adequately explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a >>>>>>>>>>> tree of semantic relations specified syntactically between >>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be
    structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is
    exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to >>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal to
    its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.


    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 08:45:45 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic expert >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less
    than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used >>>>>>>>>>>>> only by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with Alan. >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when you haven't even >>>>>>>>>>>>> adequately explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a >>>>>>>>>>>> tree of semantic relations specified syntactically between >>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be
    structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is
    exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to >>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>> when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal to
    its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 09:57:25 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used >>>>>>>>>>>>>> only by you, and it is one which you have never explicitly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't lie with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> haven't even adequately explained what it is that you mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>
    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> tree of semantic relations specified syntactically between >>>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>> when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal to
    its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 09:24:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
    [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" yesterday. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lie with Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you haven't even adequately explained what it is that you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tree of semantic relations specified syntactically between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one try to >>>>>>>>>>> put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops. >>>>>>> In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious >>>>> how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal
    to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 12:08:27 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem itself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lie with Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified fact' when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you haven't even adequately explained what it is that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tree of semantic relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one >>>>>>>>>>>> try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a loop >>>>>>>>>> when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops. >>>>>>>> In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious >>>>>> how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal
    to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.


    False, as that statement is not one of the axioms of Robinson
    arithmetic, but it is a statement in its language, and one that has
    *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of that system.

    By your logic, "no number is equal to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson arithmetic.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 12:22:32 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 11:08 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel 1931 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lie with Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified fact' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when you haven't even adequately explained what it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree of semantic relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one >>>>>>>>>>>>> try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a >>>>>>>>>>> loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops. >>>>>>>>> In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not obvious >>>>>>> how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is equal >>>>> to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.


    False, as that statement is not one of the axioms of Robinson
    arithmetic, but it is a statement in its language, and one that has
    *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of that system.

    By your logic, "no number is equal to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson arithmetic.

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable.While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 13:25:10 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 1:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 11:08 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1931 incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fact' when you haven't even adequately explained what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a tree of semantic relations specified syntactically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one >>>>>>>>>>>>>> try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never
    completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in a >>>>>>>>>>>> loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops. >>>>>>>>>> In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not
    obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is
    equal to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.


    False, as that statement is not one of the axioms of Robinson
    arithmetic, but it is a statement in its language, and one that has
    *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of that system.

    By your logic, "no number is equal to its successor" has no meaning in
    Robinson arithmetic.

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable.While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).

    So you agree that Robinson arithmetic is incomplete.

    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From olcott@polcott333@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 12:39:37 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 12:25 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 11:08 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1931 incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly not a 'verified >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fact' when you haven't even adequately explained what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a tree of semantic relations specified >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> syntactically between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never >>>>>>>>>>>>>> completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in >>>>>>>>>>>>> a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent loops. >>>>>>>>>>> In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially
    PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability
    or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not >>>>>>>>> obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is
    equal to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic.



    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.


    False, as that statement is not one of the axioms of Robinson
    arithmetic, but it is a statement in its language, and one that has
    *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of that system.

    By your logic, "no number is equal to its successor" has no meaning
    in Robinson arithmetic.

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable.While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).

    So you agree that Robinson arithmetic is incomplete.


    It is as complete as it was designed to be.
    --
    Copyright 2026 Olcott

    My 28 year goal has been to make
    "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
    reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.
    The complete structure of this system is now defined.

    The entire body of knowledge expressed in language is
    comprised of two types of relations between finite strings:
    (a) *Axioms* Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true.

    My system bridges the analytic/synthetic distinction by
    expressly encoding all empirical "atomic facts" in a formal
    language such as CycL of the Cyc project.

    (b) *Inference Rules* Expressions of language that are semantically
    entailed syntactically from (a) and/or (b).
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
  • From dbush@dbush.mobile@gmail.com to comp.theory,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.logic,sci.math on Fri Jun 26 13:42:35 2026
    From Newsgroup: comp.ai.philosophy

    On 6/26/2026 1:39 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 12:25 PM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:22 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 11:08 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 10:24 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:57 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:45 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 8:20 AM, dbush wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 9:10 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 6/26/2026 1:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 25/06/2026 19:14, olcott wrote:
    On 6/25/2026 2:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 24/06/2026 23:26, olcott wrote:
    On 6/24/2026 5:00 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 23/06/2026 17:48, olcott wrote:
    On 6/23/2026 1:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 15:10, olcott wrote:
    On 6/22/2026 1:49 AM, Mikko wrote:
    On 22/06/2026 02:02, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 4:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-21 14:42, olcott wrote:
    On 6/21/2026 3:04 PM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [ Followup-To: set ]

    In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/21/2026 6:26 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In comp.theory olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I just found the term:
    "grounding in a proof theoretic atomic base" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yesterday.

    You can find any number of terms.  That doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean you're capable of
    understanding them.


    The above is the key reason why under PTS Gödel >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1931 incompleteness
    fails.

    I don't believe you.  You have no respect for or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the
    truth.  If you really want to persuade anybody >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that PTS somehow causes
    Gödel's theorem not to hold, then cite an academic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expert who'll have
    some credibility.

    If they are mere gibberish words to you then you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will not understand.

    You don't understand Proof-theoritic Semantics, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you certainly don't
    understand Gödel's Theorem, neither the theorem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself nor any proof of
    it.

    It is a verified fact that Gödel's G is ungrounded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the atomic base of PA. That you do not understand >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what: "grounded in the atomic base" means is less >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> than no rebuttal at all.

    "grounded in the atomic base of PA" is an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used only by you, and it is one which you have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicitly defined, so the fault here certainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't lie with Alan. It's certainly not a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'verified fact' when you haven't even adequately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explained what it is that you mean.

    All of knowledge expressed in language is structured >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as a tree of semantic relations specified >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> syntactically between finite strings.

    What makes you believe semantic relations that can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured as
    a tree are sufficient to contain all knowledge that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exressed in
    some language?

    The CycL language and the Cyc Project.

    They use a tree structure for concepts. But why would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one try to
    put knowledge in a tree structure?

    It must at least be a directed acyclic graph or
    the proof gets stuck in an infinite loop and never >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completes.

    How can any ordering of knowledge prevent getting stuck in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a loop
    when looking for a proof?

    By looking upward in a type hierarchy.

    If you mean not looking elsewhere that may indeed prevent >>>>>>>>>>>> loops.
    In most cases that also prevents finding the proof.

    Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
    compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS). Essentially >>>>>>>>>>> PTS just coherently connects the semantic meanings
    expressed in language together into one coherent body
    of general knowledge. It does this without undecidability >>>>>>>>>>> or mathematical incompleteness.

    Looking for a proof does not need any semantics so it is not >>>>>>>>>> obvious
    how switching to another semantics could improve it.


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof.

    In other words, you're saying that the sentence "no number is >>>>>>>> equal to its successor" has no meaning in Robinson Arithmetic. >>>>>>>>


    In proof theoretic semantics an expression only gains
    semantic meaning by finding a proof from within a
    stipulated atomic base of its own axioms like the one
    that you provided.



    Then you agree that the above natural language sentence that is
    semantically required to be either true or false has no meaning?


    Your sentence would be what it always has been
    a stipulated true sentence axiom.


    False, as that statement is not one of the axioms of Robinson
    arithmetic, but it is a statement in its language, and one that has
    *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of that system.

    By your logic, "no number is equal to its successor" has no meaning
    in Robinson arithmetic.

    In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
    the statement "no number is equal to its
    successor" is not provable.While this statement
    is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
    Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
    (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).

    So you agree that Robinson arithmetic is incomplete.


    It is as complete as it was designed to be.


    There is no "designed to be". There are sentences in the language of
    Robinson arithmetic that are true but not provable, therefore making the system incomplete, as you have just agreed, meaning that you agree that incompleteness exists.
    --- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2