From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Is contact privacy even possible on iOS given the SQLite architecture?

I have been digging into the way iOS handles the addressbook.sqlitedb
and I am struggling to see how anyone can claim privacy while the core
contact database remains a centralized, unencrypted at runtime pool
for any app with a basic permission toggle.

We all know the Apple is privacy marketing, but from a technical
standpoint, the iOS contact architecture is fundamentally leaky
compared to a hardened, siloed approach.

1. The deterministic hashing trap
Many privacy focused apps on iOS, including WhatsApp, claim to
protect data via hashing. But phone numbers are short strings with low
entropy. Because the contact discovery must be deterministic, any
company receiving those hashes can reverse them against a rainbow
table of global phone numbers in minutes.

2. No siloing / no third party database support
Unlike the Fossify ecosystem on Android, where you can physically
move your contacts into a local only, non system wide database,
iOS forces everything into one central sqlite file. Once you
toggle allow for an app, it has the keys to the entire kingdom,
names, addresses, and private notes (such as gate codes).

3. Permissions are binary, not granular
You cannot give an app read only or limited view access to a
specific group of contacts easily. It is the whole database or nothing.
This means your boss's private cell and your doordash gate codes are
sitting in the same file that a random utility can vacuum up the moment
it is granted access.

The Question
If privacy is the ability to control the flow of your information,
and if iOS forces all social data into a single, predictable, and easily reversible database format that is shared with any app you authorize,
is privacy on the iPhone actually a myth?

Are there any tools on iOS that actually silo the contact data away from
the system sqlite file, or are we just trusting Apple's gatekeeper status
while the data itself sits in plaintext once the phone is unlocked?
--
Apple tells people they have privacy when privacy is impossible on iOS.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 1, 2026 at 11:24:05 PM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10t45a4$2qob$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Is contact privacy even possible on iOS given the SQLite architecture?

I have been digging into the way iOS handles the addressbook.sqlitedb
and I am struggling to see how anyone can claim privacy while the core contact database remains a centralized, unencrypted at runtime pool
for any app with a basic permission toggle.

So you need permission. So private unless you open it.

So you have no real complaint other, perhaps, than how things like images are more granular and contacts are not.

But you are here with an agenda to push selection bias to make iOS look bad. THAT is your real issue.

...
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Is contact privacy even possible on iOS given the SQLite architecture?

I have been digging into the way iOS handles the addressbook.sqlitedb
and I am struggling to see how anyone can claim privacy while the core contact database remains a centralized, unencrypted at runtime pool
for any app with a basic permission toggle.

You're going to have explain with primary sources what exactly the problem
is.

An SQLite database is not in and of itself an problem.

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

You're going to have explain with primary sources what exactly the problem is.

An SQLite database is not in and of itself an problem.

Hi Chris,

You're asking a good question, and it's healthy for people to learn this.
<https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts/accessing-the-contact-store>

On iOS, the contacts database is located here:
/var/mobile/Library/AddressBook/AddressBook.sqlitedb

Any app with the com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

On Android, the sqlite db is open to all apps that have permission to
access them but on iOS, they get fields they request via the Contacts API.

On Android, it's all or nothing, but on iOS, Contacts framework allows
a. all
b. nothing
c. limited (i.e., specific contacts)

On Android, apps get everything in the contact (including gate codes).
On iOS they get whatever fields are in the database that they ask for.
let keysToFetch = [CNContactPhoneNumbersKey, CNContactEmailAddressesKey]

A problem is if the app wants ten fields, there is only one prompt.
"App X would like to access your contacts."

Unfortunately, iOS does not enumerate fields in the permission prompt.

So the app can get gate codes (for example), as shown below:
let keys = [
CNContactGivenNameKey,
CNContactFamilyNameKey,
CNContactMiddleNameKey,
CNContactNicknameKey,
CNContactPhoneNumbersKey,
CNContactEmailAddressesKey,
CNContactPostalAddressesKey,
CNContactBirthdayKey,
CNContactOrganizationNameKey,
CNContactNoteKey // gate codes if stored in Notes
]

(Note Android is even worse, but still, this is an open hole on iOS.)

What any given app does with your contacts matters also.
Apps can hash all they want, but they can't randomly salt their database.
So no matter how they're stored by the app, they're inherently insecure.

Android has the same problem as iOS does, but the *difference* is you can
add privacy-aware contact apps to Android that solve those problems above.
<https://f-droid.org/packages/opencontacts.open.com.opencontacts/>
(Read the description of why this app exists for more details.)

As you can tell from the description, contacts privacy is possible if you
use apps which are privacy aware, such as this entire suite from Fossify.
<https://www.fossify.org/apps/>

I only started working on this problem a couple of days ago when I
contacted the developers of OpenContacts and discussed it with them.

It took one day (elapsed time) to test out the apps & write the tutorial.
So I've solved the contacts privacy issue with Android using those apps.

Note that a key requirement is to see the contact name in the dialer!
On Android, that takes specific tools, while on iOS it may be impossible.

Now I'm trying to solve the same privacy issue with iOS if it's possible.

Note that iOS is more private by default than Android is, for contacts.
But if you know what you're doing, Android can easily be made secure.

So the question to ask is whether similar privacy-aware contacts apps
are available on iOS. Since this is so important, they must exist.

I'm simply starting my quest with this thread trying to find those apps.
--
Intelligent people create privacy by understanding the underlying system.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

You're going to have explain with primary sources what exactly the problem >> is.

An SQLite database is not in and of itself an problem.

Hi Chris,

You're asking a good question, and it's healthy for people to learn this.
<https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts/accessing-the-contact-store>

On iOS, the contacts database is located here:
/var/mobile/Library/AddressBook/AddressBook.sqlitedb

Any app with the com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact data, the person can
grant either limited or full access, or they can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS and is
very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your contacts.

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

Any app with the com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook
entitlement can then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact data, the person can grant either limited or full access, or they can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS and is very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like they do).

Notice you're acting like Snit & Alan Baker where it's extremely clear I explained how it works in detail later in more detail in that same post.

The fact is iOS contacts are nowhere near private but, out of the box,
they're "more private" than Android contacts, which is a plus for iOS.

The only way to have privacy with contacts, whether using the iOS or
Android method, is to change the underlying apps on both platforms.

I'm working on that, where I simply opened this thread to find if there was anyone on this ng who knows more than I do about iOS contact privacy.

I think I may be able to use enterprise-level tools to change "some" of the underlying apps on iOS, but the big problem is changing the phone app.

Without changing the phone app, incoming calls won't have the caller id.

So I'm working on that while we speak, where I do think I can make iOS more private than it is out of the box for contacts, but it's not easily done.
--
If privacy is a million things, most people only know about three of them.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 3, 2026 at 10:27:04 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10t80h8$rfh$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook
entitlement can then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above states: >>
"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that person grants
permission. When your app requests access to contact data, the person can
grant either limited or full access, or they can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS and is
very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like they do).

What is clear is you use selection bias and ignorance to push a strong bias. I know little of Contact security on iOS and Android, but looking into it I find this:

----------------------------------------------------------------------
iOS vs Android contact security, short version:

iOS is generally more secure by default. Contacts are hardware-encrypted, tightly sandboxed, and Apple enforces stricter app review. Permission access
is clear and consistent across devices, and updates roll out quickly.

Android also uses strong encryption on modern devices, but security varies
more by manufacturer. The permission model is comparable today, but the open ecosystem (sideloading, third-party stores) increases the risk of apps harvesting contacts.

Key point: on both platforms, once you grant an app contact access, it can usually read the whole address book. The difference is how likely it is that a bad app gets that permission in the first place.

Cloud side: neither platform is fully zero-knowledge by default, though iOS offers optional end-to-end encryption via Advanced Data Protection.

Bottom line:

* iOS: safer out of the box, more consistent
* Android: can be just as secure, but depends on device and user behavior ----------------------------------------------------------------------

You twist that and whine and pretend iOS is somehow behind. In short: you make things up and twist. You did this with security in general. iOS is far ahead
of Android there but you pretend otherwise. Pretend. It is a game to you for your trolling.

...
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook
entitlement can then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above states: >>
"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that person grants
permission. When your app requests access to contact data, the person can
grant either limited or full access, or they can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS and is
very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy

The onus is on you to demonstrate the problem without innuendo nor
assumption.

but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like they do).

I am simply reading the documentation you're sharing. There's no "excuse".

Notice you're acting like Snit & Alan Baker

And here we go. As soon as someone pokes holes in your latest fever dream,
you attack the messenger rather than defend your position with evidence or
any facts.

--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Brock McNuggets <brock.mcnuggets@gmail.com> wrote in news:69f78d64$1$25$882e4bbb@reader.netnews.com:

On May 3, 2026 at 10:27:04 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10t80h8$rfh$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the
com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can
then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above
states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that
person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact
data, the person can grant either limited or full access, or they
can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS
and is very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your
contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter
what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like
they do).

What is clear is that you are

A troll Brock McNuggets, snit, Michael Glasser or whatever your nym of
the week is.

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews







--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On 03 May 2026 21:46:29 GMT, AZP wrote:

Brock McNuggets <brock.mcnuggets@gmail.com> wrote in news:69f78d64$1$25$882e4bbb@reader.netnews.com:

On May 3, 2026 at 10:27:04 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote
<10t80h8$rfh$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the
com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can
then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above
states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that
person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact
data, the person can grant either limited or full access, or they
can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS
and is very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your
contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter
what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like
they do).

What is clear is that you are

A troll Brock McNuggets, snit, Michael Glasser or whatever your nym of
the week is.

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews

Good advice.
Avoid this Brock joker because he will nymshift all over the place in
order to back his own stupid claims.
This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Anonymous wrote:

This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

In this video, Snit claims iOS can graph wi-fi & cellular signal strength (which is measured in decibels, by the way) because he sees a moving graph.
<https://youtu.be/7QaABa6DFIo>

Remember the lemon-juice bank robber who inspired Dunning-Kruger papers?
That's Snit.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

AZP wrote:

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

In this thread, he defends Apple to the death by saying, in effect, because
he isn't aware of privacy issues with iOS contacts, then they can't exist.

That's Snit.

He's like the classic lemon-juice bank robber Dunning & Kruger studied.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy

The onus is on you to demonstrate the problem without innuendo nor assumption.

Hi Chris,

The point of this thread is to find a way for better iOS contacts privacy.
The same question was asked on the Android newsgroup so it is a fair goal.

The very fact the user has no idea which contact permissions are being
asked for is a problem. And that messages can't be made private is too.

Whether you comprehend it or not, iOS does not granularize permissions by field so the prompt simply does not enumerate what the app will access.

I've known this for years.
But I had never tried to solve this privacy flaw until recently.

It's widely known to people who understand privacy that the only real
solution is keeping contacts out of the system address book entirely,

To solve this privacy issue, I dug deeper to find that privacy-focused contacts apps do exist on iOS, and several of them explicitly solve the
some of the "separate, encrypted, not visible to other apps" problems.

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

So the only viable path is keeping sensitive contacts out of the system database entirely, which is the goal that I seek to solve in this thread.

The strongest options today appear to be Savelon, Stealth Contacts and GhostContact, all of which create independently private contact stores that are not exposed through the system Contacts framework.

Savelon, for example, (which also works on Android & macOS) has
a. 256-bit on-device encryption
b. No cloud, no servers, open source
c. Completely separate contact store
d. Password-protected backups
e. Designed specifically for private contacts
<https://savelon.com/>

Perhaps better, Stealth Contacts, which allows seeing the caller's name without putting them in the system Contacts database, has a
a. Private vault with Face ID / passcode
b. Caller ID works even though contacts are not in system Contacts
c. Invisible to all other apps
d. Never appears in Spotlight, call history, or search
e. Optional iCloud sync that does not touch iCloud Contacts
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/stealth-contacts/id6760033667>

Similar to Stealth Contacts but simpler is Ghost Contacts which also
shows caller ID using the CXCallDirectoryProvider, which
a. Creates a second, private contact list
b. Caller ID works without adding to system Contacts
c. Data stored only on device
d. No access by other apps
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ghostcontact-private-contacts/id6742730895>

Even after enabling the CallKit extension in
Settings > Phone > Call Blocking & Identification.
there are still unplugged iOS privacy holes in call logs and in messages.

The call log leak:
Even if a contact is in a "Stealth" vault, when the call ends, the phone
number will still appear in our native Phone app's "Recents" tab.
It just won't have a name attached to it. If an app has "Call Log" access
it can see the metadata of the call, just not the identity of the caller.

The messages leak:
Even if a contact lives entirely inside a Stealth-style vault, iOS Messages still exposes the phone number because Messages only consults the system database, not any private contact store. Incoming texts create a permanent thread tied to the raw number, which is then indexed by Spotlight,
suggested by Siri, shown in the share sheet, and stored in the Messages database (and in iCloud if syncing is enabled). The identity stays hidden,
but the number, timestamps, and conversation metadata remain visible to the
OS and to any app with notification or message-related access.

For example, to see "John Doe" in our text messages, we are forced to add
him to the system Contacts. Once we do that, the privacy "wall" is broken.
.
Every other app with contact permission (Facebook, TikTok, etc.)
can now see that contact, and specifically, if they get the Notes
field, if you put a gate code in that field, those third-party
apps can now steal that code (if they request that field).

On iOS, we can have a "Private Dialer" experience, but we cannot
currently have a "Private Texter" experience while using the native
Messages app. To keep our identity safe in texts, we have to use an
entirely different app like Signal, which maintains its own internal
(and private) contact list.
--
Of a million things people should know about privacy, most know 3. .
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On 2026-05-03 5:46 p.m., AZP wrote:

Brock McNuggets <brock.mcnuggets@gmail.com> wrote in news:69f78d64$1$25$882e4bbb@reader.netnews.com:

On May 3, 2026 at 10:27:04 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote
<10t80h8$rfh$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the
com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can
then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above
states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that
person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact
data, the person can grant either limited or full access, or they
can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS
and is very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your
contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter
what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like
they do).

What is clear is that you are

A troll Brock McNuggets, snit, Michael Glasser or whatever your nym of
the week is.

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews

Growing up, when people had to pick players for their team and Snit
Michael Glasser Prescott Parasite and Computer Guy was last, the team preferred not to play than to pick him.
--
CrudeSausage
M4 MacBook Air
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On 2026-05-03 6:26 p.m., Anonymous wrote:

On 03 May 2026 21:46:29 GMT, AZP wrote:

Brock McNuggets <brock.mcnuggets@gmail.com> wrote in
news:69f78d64$1$25$882e4bbb@reader.netnews.com:

On May 3, 2026 at 10:27:04 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote
<10t80h8$rfh$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Any app with the
com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook entitlement can >>>>>> then read it via the "Contacts.framework".

Incorrect. As the first paragraph in the Dev link you shared above
states:

"Your app canʼt access a personʼs Contacts entries until that
person grants permission. When your app requests access to contact
data, the person can grant either limited or full access, or they
can deny the request."

The answer to your OP is: Yes, contacts privacy is possible on iOS
and is very easy to achieve. Just deny all requests to access your
contacts.

Hi Chris,

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy, but it's also clear you defend Apple to the death, no matter
what, using the first absurd excuse that pops into your head (like
they do).

What is clear is that you are

A troll Brock McNuggets, snit, Michael Glasser or whatever your nym of
the week is.

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock
McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews

Good advice.
Avoid this Brock joker because he will nymshift all over the place in
order to back his own stupid claims.
This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.

He's hoping that one day, his efforts will be compensated so that he can
move out of the hole in the ground he shares with rabbits and groundhogs.
--
CrudeSausage
M4 MacBook Air
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 3, 2026 at 9:45:43 PM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10t989n$e2f$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Anonymous wrote:

This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,

Except when I am calling them out on bugs nobody else even notices, right?
LOL!

using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

In this video, Snit claims iOS can graph wi-fi & cellular signal strength (which is measured in decibels, by the way) because he sees a moving graph.
<https://youtu.be/7QaABa6DFIo>

Where do you hear the word "decibels" in that video?

Remember the lemon-juice bank robber who inspired Dunning-Kruger papers? That's Snit.

The evidence that freaked you out -- when you were pretending Android is more secure than iOS:

1. https://www.getastra.com/blog/security-audit/malware-statistics/ -- Android devices are 50x more likely to be infected than iOS devices, showing the starkest difference in malware prevalence.

2. https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/20-current-android-malware-stats/ -- Android malware attacks reached 33.3 million in 2024; iOS attacks remain very rare.

3. https://securelist.com/mobile-threat-report-2024/115494/ -- Android is the main target for mobile malware, with Trojan banker attacks up 196%; iOS sees far fewer infections.

4. https://46745145.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/46745145/MAPS_MTD/REPORT/GEN/Global%20Mobile%20Threat%20Report%202024%20FINAL%20(1).pdf
-- Android's ecosystem is more broadly exposed to attacks than iOS.

5. https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/android-vs-iphone-mobile-security
-- Android faces far higher malware volume; both require updates and safe practices.

6. https://www.qualysec.com/ios-vs-android-security/ -- iOS is more secure by default; Android needs careful management to match safety.

7. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370667917_Comparative_Study_of_Information_Security_in_Mobile_Operating_Systems_Android_and_Apple_iOS
-- iOS has superior information security architecture versus Android.

8. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312279414_Security_Evaluation_of_IOS_and_Android/fulltext/587b977308ae4445c06422df/Security-Evaluation-of-IOS-and-Android.pdf
-- iOS offers better enterprise security; Android requires careful management.

9. https://www.renemayrhofer.com/courses/android-security/selected-paper/2023/Android_and_iOS_Platform_Security-A_Comparison.pdf
-- iOS shows stronger hardware and system-level security in 2023-2024.

10. https://www.approov.io/hubfs/White%20Paper/WP-Comparison%20of%20Apple%2C%20Android%20and%20Huawei%20Mobile%20App%20Security%20v1.0%20FINAL(2).pdf
-- iOS apps are more secure by default due to App Store restrictions.

11. https://www.getastra.com/blog/mobile/ios-vs-android-security/ -- iOS's controlled ecosystem reduces malware exposure; Android's openness increases
the attack surface.

12. https://www.corrata.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Mobile-Security-Whitepaper-Final-Nov-20112017.pdf
-- iOS is less susceptible to mass malware; Android's openness increases exposure.

13. https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/report/q1-2024-mobile-landscape-threat-report
-- Enterprise spyware targets iOS even though Android dominates overall
malware volume.

14. https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/report/q2-2024-mobile-landscape-threat-report
-- Mobile phishing and malicious web content are rising; iOS is increasingly targeted in enterprise.

15. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2024/12/26/mobile-devices-attacks/ -- iOS faced higher phishing exposure (18.4%) than Android (11.4%), despite Android's higher malware volume.

16. https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/vulnerability-comparison-android-vs-ios-in-the-face-of-cyber-attacks/
-- Android is more exposed to vulnerabilities, but iOS still faces targeted attacks.

17. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04754 -- Android devices are significantly more prone to persistent malware infections than iOS.

18. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.12613 -- iOS offers stronger protection against unauthorized access; Android needs extra management.

19. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.13722 -- Both OSes have privacy/data collection issues; Android apps are more likely to leak sensitive information.

20. https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0047.pdf -- iOS privacy labels are slightly more effective than Android in helping users understand data collection.

21. https://www.promon.io/security-news/android-vs-ios-security -- Security depends more on user behavior, patching, and configuration than OS alone.

22. https://www.norton.com/blog/mobile/android-vs-ios-which-is-more-secure -- iOS generally offers stronger default security; user behavior is the main risk on both platforms.

23. https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/Tc13/reports/2024-mobile-security-index.pdf
-- Android is riskier in enterprise without strong management; mobile devices remain key breach vectors.

24. https://lp.zimperium.com/hubfs/Reports/2025%20Global%20Mobile%20Threat%20Report.pdf
-- Sideloaded apps and older Android devices greatly increase enterprise risk; iOS risk comes mostly from targeted attacks.
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 3, 2026 at 9:47:59 PM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10t98dv$i4f$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

AZP wrote:

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock
McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

Insults to show your insecurities. Got it.

In this thread, he defends Apple to the death by saying, in effect, because he isn't aware of privacy issues with iOS contacts, then they can't exist.

But you have no MID or quote to show that. Odd.

What I noted is you have no real point. And you do not. Other than you are an extremely biased person pushing confirmation bias and half truths.

That's Snit.

He's like the classic lemon-juice bank robber Dunning & Kruger studied.

See: you just make insults and attacks... I show evidence.
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

It's clear from your response that you do not understand iOS contacts
privacy

The onus is on you to demonstrate the problem without innuendo nor
assumption.

Hi Chris,

The point of this thread is to find a way for better iOS contacts privacy. The same question was asked on the Android newsgroup so it is a fair goal.

Which is going as well as the majority of your so-called questions. 6/9 of posts are from you.

The very fact the user has no idea which contact permissions are being
asked for is a problem.

"no idea" is an exaggeration. Privacy and permissions are pretty clear.

And that messages can't be made private is too.

Whether you comprehend it or not, iOS does not granularize permissions by field so the prompt simply does not enumerate what the app will access.

It's still under your control, if that level of granularity matters to you.

I've known this for years.
But I had never tried to solve this privacy flaw until recently.

"flaw" is very subjective.

It's widely known to people who understand privacy that the only real solution is keeping contacts out of the system address book entirely,

To solve this privacy issue, I dug deeper to find that privacy-focused contacts apps do exist on iOS, and several of them explicitly solve the
some of the "separate, encrypted, not visible to other apps" problems.

With some significant usability compromises.

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

Two of the "facts" are duplicated.

So the only viable path is keeping sensitive contacts out of the system database entirely, which is the goal that I seek to solve in this thread.

The strongest options today appear to be Savelon, Stealth Contacts and GhostContact, all of which create independently private contact stores that are not exposed through the system Contacts framework.

Savelon, for example, (which also works on Android & macOS) has
a. 256-bit on-device encryption
b. No cloud, no servers, open source
c. Completely separate contact store
d. Password-protected backups
e. Designed specifically for private contacts
<https://savelon.com/>

Perhaps better, Stealth Contacts, which allows seeing the caller's name without putting them in the system Contacts database, has a
a. Private vault with Face ID / passcode
b. Caller ID works even though contacts are not in system Contacts
c. Invisible to all other apps
d. Never appears in Spotlight, call history, or search
e. Optional iCloud sync that does not touch iCloud Contacts
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/stealth-contacts/id6760033667>

Similar to Stealth Contacts but simpler is Ghost Contacts which also
shows caller ID using the CXCallDirectoryProvider, which
a. Creates a second, private contact list
b. Caller ID works without adding to system Contacts
c. Data stored only on device
d. No access by other apps
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ghostcontact-private-contacts/id6742730895>

Even after enabling the CallKit extension in
Settings > Phone > Call Blocking & Identification.
there are still unplugged iOS privacy holes in call logs and in messages.

The call log leak:
Even if a contact is in a "Stealth" vault, when the call ends, the phone number will still appear in our native Phone app's "Recents" tab.
It just won't have a name attached to it. If an app has "Call Log" access
it can see the metadata of the call, just not the identity of the caller.

The messages leak:
Even if a contact lives entirely inside a Stealth-style vault, iOS Messages still exposes the phone number because Messages only consults the system database, not any private contact store. Incoming texts create a permanent thread tied to the raw number, which is then indexed by Spotlight,
suggested by Siri, shown in the share sheet,

Only if the user enables that.

and stored in the Messages
database (and in iCloud if syncing is enabled). The identity stays hidden, but the number, timestamps, and conversation metadata remain visible to the OS and to any app with notification or message-related access.

Again only if sharing is enabled.

For example, to see "John Doe" in our text messages, we are forced to add him to the system Contacts. Once we do that, the privacy "wall" is broken.

Incorrect. The data is not shared with any other app without explicit permission.

Every other app with contact permission (Facebook, TikTok, etc.)
can now see that contact,

Only if you have provided complete access to your access to all apps.

and specifically, if they get the Notes
field, if you put a gate code in that field, those third-party
apps can now steal that code (if they request that field).

A gate code? If that's secure access information, I would argue that should
go in a password manager. Not a contacts app.

On iOS, we can have a "Private Dialer" experience, but we cannot
currently have a "Private Texter" experience while using the native
Messages app. To keep our identity safe in texts, we have to use an
entirely different app like Signal, which maintains its own internal
(and private) contact list.

Correct. The model in iOS (and Android and other mainstream OSes TBF) is to balance usability with privacy. If you want more privacy at the expense of usability, you need to go with alternative providers.

This is not an obvious flaw or failure of ios or android.

Thanks for explaining this issue you have thoroughly. As I've highlighted
there are some shortcomings in your assumptions.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

CrudeSausage wrote:

For those who may not be aware, here is a bit of information on the brock
McNuggets troll.
It's best to bin him.

https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews

Growing up, when people had to pick players for their team and Snit
Michael Glasser Prescott Parasite and Computer Guy was last, the team preferred not to play than to pick him.

In all serious reality, people like Snit and Alan Baker have been told
their entire lives, by every single entity around them, that they're
stupid, and that has had an effect on them which we haven't felt ourselves.

But it's more than sheer stupidity, because ignorance plays a huge role.
They know nothing. About anything.

We've proven this many times with both of them, but what makes them more irksome on Usenet is they also lack basic adult comprehensive skills.

Remember McArthur Wheeler? The lemon-juice bank robber?
He seriously believed that lemon juice made his face invisible.

Why?
Because it made invisible ink invisible.

No amount of persuasion would convince someone like Snit & Alan otherwise.
No amount of logic could ever be comprehended by the likes of Snit & Alan.

Both refute everything they don't know.
Which is everything.

Take the case of Snit refuting that iOS can't graph cellular signal
strength for all access points in the vicinity on a moving graph.
<https://groups.google.com/g/misc.phone.mobile.iphone/c/PZuec56EWB0>
<https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/misc.phone.mobile.iphone/PZuec56EWB0>

Snit proceeded to connect to a single Wi-Fi access point, and graphed, um,
er, ah, "something" (which wasn't signal strength) and claimed victory.
<https://youtu.be/7QaABa6DFIo>

Worse, the Apple trolls cheered him on, by claiming he'd refuted the fact.
WTF?

Who does that?

Who is so incredibly uncomprehensive that they don't know the difference between a moving graph of "something" versus a set of moving graphs of
signal strength for all access points in the vicinity of the device.

But being just uncomprehensive isn't what makes Snit & Alan what they are. They're insistent that they're NOT dunning-kruger left of Mount Stupid.

What does this require to be to the left of the first quartile marker?
a. To be in the bottom %25 you have to be in the low-competence zone
b. You haven't put in the effort or time to understand the topic
c. Or, you don't have the mental acuity to comprehend the topic

But you need a second trait which both Alan Baker and Snit exemplify.
They lack the cognitive skill to know what it is they don't know.

And you need to add a third trait, which Snit & Alan Baker exude.
They own a confidence level that is massively disproportionate
to their actual skill.

Put those three things together (as they are in Alan Baker & Snit),
and ever subject seems not only simple to them, but since what they
know is so little about it, they feel they know everything there is.

Take Snit on security. He thinks it's only malware. Nothing else.
He couldn't be farther from the mark, and he doesn't even know it.

He has all three traits that McArthur Wheeler had.
a. He knows nothing (for a variety of reasons, low IQ being only one)
b. He thinks he knows everything
c. So he's supremely confident, of his (lack of) competence.

That's Snit.
<https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/17825/what-is-the-primary-source-of-the-mount-stupid-graphic>

In the case of Apple newsgroups, both Snit & Alan Baker know nothing.
Worse, they think they know everything. And they're confident about it.

So what they do to refute any facts they don't know (which is all facts),
is they come up with the first absurd excuse they can possibly think of.

The fact that their excuses are absurd doesn't even dawn upon them.
Take Snit who says security is only malware, for example.
a. Who does that? Nobody right? And yet, Snit says that.
b. Scores of times he posts the same malware list. For years.
c. As if security is nothing more than a list of malware apps.

Q: What kind of strange person thinks and acts that way?
A: McArthur Wheeler, Snit and Alan Baker.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

The point of this thread is to find a way for better iOS contacts privacy. >> The same question was asked on the Android newsgroup so it is a fair goal.

Which is going as well as the majority of your so-called questions. 6/9 of posts are from you.

Hi Chris,

I'm going to ignore your incessant attacks, especially since we've made progress on Android privacy, essentially solving the problem set there.

You constantly throwing insults that are the first absurd insult you can
think of, not only doesn't "hurt my feelings", but is untoward of you.

Stop it.
Act like an adult.

Either add on-topic adult value, or stop throwing the first absurd insult
you can think of, which doesn't add any value to the technical value.

I'm going to open a thread which catalogs the insults thrown in response to
a technical topic starting in fifteen minutes, so we can catalog these.

Newsgroups: misc.phone.mobile.iphone,comp.sys.mac.advocacy,comp.mobile.ipad
Subject: Log of incessant insults thrown in this newsgroup that add no on-topic value
Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 11:49:09 -0600
Message-ID: <10tam6m$490$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>

The hope is neither anyone nor I throw insults at each other forevermore
in the hopes of derailing a topic such as this one about iOS contacts.

Game?
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

The very fact the user has no idea which contact permissions are being
asked for is a problem.

"no idea" is an exaggeration. Privacy and permissions are pretty clear.

Hi Chris,

Why do you think these privacy-based contacts-privacy apps exist?
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/savelon-private-contacts/id6755902938>
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/stealth-contacts/id6760033667>
<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ghostcontact-private-contacts/id6742730895>

And that messages can't be made private is too.

Whether you comprehend it or not, iOS does not granularize permissions by >> field so the prompt simply does not enumerate what the app will access.

It's still under your control, if that level of granularity matters to you.

What do the three privacy-based contacts apps I've found have in common?

I've known this for years.
But I had never tried to solve this privacy flaw until recently.

"flaw" is very subjective.

Why do you think people who understand iOS privacy suggest those 3 apps?

It's widely known to people who understand privacy that the only real
solution is keeping contacts out of the system address book entirely,

To solve this privacy issue, I dug deeper to find that privacy-focused
contacts apps do exist on iOS, and several of them explicitly solve the
some of the "separate, encrypted, not visible to other apps" problems.

With some significant usability compromises.

Privacy, just like hygiene, requires compromises, like washing your hands.

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

Two of the "facts" are duplicated.

Stop it. So what? I spent HOURS writing that post and made many edits.
You spend seconds rebuking a simply typographical error? WTF?

If you don't like the facts, come up with a better rebuttal. Please.
Don't rebuke facts using the first absurd excuse you can think of.

Those leaks are very real because they're ingrained into the iOS design.

The call log leak:
The messages leak:

Only if the user enables that.

Fair enough.
But does the user *understand* that risk?

and stored in the Messages
database (and in iCloud if syncing is enabled). The identity stays hidden, >> but the number, timestamps, and conversation metadata remain visible to the >> OS and to any app with notification or message-related access.

Again only if sharing is enabled.

Fair enough.
But does the user *understand* that risk?

For example, to see "John Doe" in our text messages, we are forced to add >> him to the system Contacts. Once we do that, the privacy "wall" is broken.

Incorrect. The data is not shared with any other app without explicit permission.

How are you going to see "John Doe" called you without adding him?
And, if you add him, every app with that field's permission will see him.

Every other app with contact permission (Facebook, TikTok, etc.)
can now see that contact,

Only if you have provided complete access to your access to all apps.

Um... Chris. The fact you said that worries me. It worries me a lot.
How do you think contacts permission works on iOS?

Do you realize that it's all or none?
If you grant WhatsApp contacts permission, what granularity do you have?

Hint: none

and specifically, if they get the Notes
field, if you put a gate code in that field, those third-party
apps can now steal that code (if they request that field).

A gate code? If that's secure access information, I would argue that should go in a password manager. Not a contacts app.

Please do not attempt to claim to refute a privacy hole by saying nobody
should use that field because that doesn't change it's a privacy hole.

Most people don't *know* which apps are reading their notes, Chris.
Do you?

The "Notes" field in a digital contact card is one of the most overlooked security vulnerabilities on a smartphone. Because it is an unencrypted, free-text field, people often treat it like a "digital junk drawer" for information they are afraid of forgetting, like birthdays and entry instructions and account numbers for business contacts, etc. .

For you to claim it shouldn't even exist is an absurd excuse, Chris.
a. Because it does exist.
b. And people use it.
c. For whatever they want.

Are you claiming nobody puts sensitive information in the Notes field?
Or are you claiming no app asks for that information in the Notes field?

On iOS, we can have a "Private Dialer" experience, but we cannot
currently have a "Private Texter" experience while using the native
Messages app. To keep our identity safe in texts, we have to use an
entirely different app like Signal, which maintains its own internal
(and private) contact list.

Correct. The model in iOS (and Android and other mainstream OSes TBF) is to balance usability with privacy. If you want more privacy at the expense of usability, you need to go with alternative providers.

Say something we don't all know, Chris.

This is not an obvious flaw or failure of ios or android.

Well, I happen to understand how contacts work on both platforms.

And while iOS is "more private" by default, Android is more private
overall. But this isn't about which has better privacy since we've
established long ago the basic undeniable fact that privacy is impossible
on iOS due to the mothership account requirement (if you want apps).

Thanks for explaining this issue you have thoroughly. As I've highlighted there are some shortcomings in your assumptions.

The only shortcoming, that I can see you highlighted, is that it takes both understanding and effort to obtain contacts privacy on the iOS platform.

Did you think I didn't know that?

I am asking here for help in improving iOS contacts privacy.
Not excuses to defend Apple to the death no matter what using the first
absurd excuse you can think of.

What do you think of the three apps that I unearthed while researching?
Can you summarize how they add privacy to iOS that isn't there by default?
--
Of the million things people need to know about privacy, most know 3.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 4, 2026 at 10:53:57 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10tamfl$76e$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

The point of this thread is to find a way for better iOS contacts privacy. >>> The same question was asked on the Android newsgroup so it is a fair goal. >>

Which is going as well as the majority of your so-called questions. 6/9 of >> posts are from you.

Hi Chris,

I'm going to ignore your incessant attacks,

But you keep making them.

especially since we've made
progress on Android privacy, essentially solving the problem set there.

You constantly throwing insults that are the first absurd insult you can think of, not only doesn't "hurt my feelings", but is untoward of you.

Glad you are starting to get that!

Stop it.
Act like an adult.

Do you understand you are talking to yourself here? LOL!

Either add on-topic adult value, or stop throwing the first absurd insult
you can think of, which doesn't add any value to the technical value.

That is what you do with me.

I'm going to open a thread which catalogs the insults thrown in response to
a technical topic starting in fifteen minutes, so we can catalog these.

And surely you will include your own, right?

Newsgroups: misc.phone.mobile.iphone,comp.sys.mac.advocacy,comp.mobile.ipad
Subject: Log of incessant insults thrown in this newsgroup that add no on-topic value
Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 11:49:09 -0600
Message-ID: <10tam6m$490$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>

The hope is neither anyone nor I throw insults at each other forevermore
in the hopes of derailing a topic such as this one about iOS contacts.

Game?

As long as you include your own!
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On Sun, 3 May 2026 22:45:43 -0600, Maria Sophia wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

In this video, Snit claims iOS can graph wi-fi & cellular signal strength (which is measured in decibels, by the way) because he sees a moving graph.
<https://youtu.be/7QaABa6DFIo>

It's well known that snit's technical knowledge is less than zero.
He also has a voice like a fagala. Some claim he/she/it is a queen
which if true shouldn't surprise anyone.

Remember the lemon-juice bank robber who inspired Dunning-Kruger papers? That's Snit.

I did not but I looked it up and yes that's about the level of mental
acuity snit displays.

Read all about the snit troll here.
https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 4, 2026 at 12:45:23 PM MST, "Anonymous" wrote <ur4zsupbya0.1tubonzkhbdfy$.dlg@40tude.net>:

On Sun, 3 May 2026 22:45:43 -0600, Maria Sophia wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

This Brock fool has been trolling USENET for at least 20 years.
Let that sink in.

Notice that this Snit troll defends Apple to the death, no matter what,
using the first inanely absurd excuse that suddenly pops into his mind.

In this video, Snit claims iOS can graph wi-fi & cellular signal strength
(which is measured in decibels, by the way) because he sees a moving graph. >> <https://youtu.be/7QaABa6DFIo>

It's well known that snit's technical knowledge is less than zero.
He also has a voice like a fagala. Some claim he/she/it is a queen
which if true shouldn't surprise anyone.

Remember the lemon-juice bank robber who inspired Dunning-Kruger papers?
That's Snit.

I did not but I looked it up and yes that's about the level of mental
acuity snit displays.

Read all about the snit troll here.
https://tinyurl.com/WhatIsSnit
https://tinyurl.com/Snitliesmethods
https://tinyurl.com/Snit-Reviews

No evidence just trolling on your part. Drop dead sock puppet.
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Anonymous wrote:

Remember the lemon-juice bank robber who inspired Dunning-Kruger papers?
That's Snit.

I did not but I looked it up and yes that's about the level of mental
acuity snit displays.

Thank you for looking it up because nobody normal acts like the lemon-juice bank robber did, which is why Dunning/Kruger were inspired to research it.
"He believed lemon juice would make him invisible to cameras because
lemon juice can be used as invisible ink. He assumed the same principle
applied to his face."

What kind of strange person thinks like that?

The case was so striking that psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger used it as the opening anecdote in their 1999 paper on cognitive bias.

They used Wheeler as a vivid example of the bank robber's
a. Extreme overconfidence about his self-assessed knowledge/skill level
b. Which lead to an extreme lack of awareness of his own incompetence
c. Yet he clearly had an actual lack of knowledge/skill in that area

The idea that D-K explored is that people who perform poorly often don't
know how poorly they're performing because they are overly confident of
their skills when they don't have the skills to even judge their skills.

Only others can judge their skill level.
And, for those to the left of the first quartile, others judge them poorly.

This became known as the Dunning-Kruger effect.

Someone can be so lacking in knowledge that they don't know what they don't know & therefore they feel unjustifiably confident of their competence.

In common vernacular, they're to the left of Mount Stupid.
<https://psychology.stackexchange.com/questions/17825/what-is-the-primary-source-of-the-mount-stupid-graphic>

In common terms, they're so incredibly stupid, that not only do they not realize how incredibly stupid they are, but they're supremely confident.

Do you know anyone like that?
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

Two of the "facts" are duplicated.

Stop it. So what? I spent HOURS writing that post and made many edits.

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!? You need
to get a different hobby.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On 2026-05-07, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> wrote:

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

Two of the "facts" are duplicated.

Stop it. So what? I spent HOURS writing that post and made many edits.

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!? You need
to get a different hobby.

Dude literally spends all of his time weak trolling news groups for
products he hates with every fiber of his being. Fucking pathetic excuse
of a human being.
--
E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter.
I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

JR
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!?

Ignoring your incessant insults, if the only thing you can find wrong with
the technical discussion is a typographical error, then you agree, Chris.

It's impossible to have iOS contacts privacy due to stated privacy flaws.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On 2026-05-07 2:02 p.m., Jolly Roger wrote:

On 2026-05-07, Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> wrote:

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

Given the fact that...
a. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
b. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
c. iOS cannot granularize Contacts permissions by field.
d. iOS cannot show which fields an app will access.
e. iOS cannot replace the system dialer with a privacy-aware one.

Two of the "facts" are duplicated.

Stop it. So what? I spent HOURS writing that post and made many edits.

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!? You need
to get a different hobby.

Dude literally spends all of his time weak trolling news groups for
products he hates with every fiber of his being. Fucking pathetic excuse
of a human being.

The worst part is that he has no good reason to hate those products.
--
CrudeSausage
Zephyrus G14 2021
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From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:

Chris wrote:

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!?

Ignoring your incessant insults, if the only thing you can find wrong with the technical discussion is a typographical error, then you agree, Chris.

You commented on the four or five other errors I found.

It's impossible to have iOS contacts privacy due to stated privacy flaws.

False.


--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 7, 2026 at 11:55:57 AM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10tin7t$1vtt$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Lol. You spend "hours" on a post and *still* get so much wrong!?

Ignoring your incessant insults, if the only thing you can find wrong with the technical discussion is a typographical error, then you agree, Chris.

It's impossible to have iOS contacts privacy due to stated privacy flaws.

Can you give a real-world example?

Hint: darn unlikely, at least where iOS users are at more risk than Android users.
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

Chris wrote:

Ignoring your incessant insults, if the only thing you can find wrong with >> the technical discussion is a typographical error, then you agree, Chris.

You commented on the four or five other errors I found.

Hi Chris,

I explained how iOS contacts work with respect to inherent privacy flaws.

All you ever do when you attempt to refute facts, is you say all facts are wrong, but you never seem to show any indication you know how it works.

It was clear to me, from what you wrote, you have no idea how it works.

Hence, you just claiming everything is wrong without explaining how you
think it works, is not something that anyone can possibly discuss with you.

It's impossible to have iOS contacts privacy due to stated privacy flaws.

False.

I explained very clearly where iOS contacts privacy is impossible, Chris.
For you to simply say 'false', means you actually agree with me, Chris.

But I won't be hard on you as it's clear you have no idea how contacts
work, so I think you're just saying "false" because you don't like that I
shoed that it's impossible (as far as we know) to have iOS contacts
privacy.

Note, it's very clear, to me, which I explained in earlier threads and on
the Android newsgroup, that iOS contacts are certainly "more private" than Android contacts, out of the box.

But while you can easily make Android contacts private, it's impossible to
make iOS contacts private (unless, of course, you jailbreak the device).
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.ipad

On May 8, 2026 at 12:58:27 PM MST, "Maria Sophia" wrote <10tlf93$277d$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>:

Chris wrote:

Ignoring your incessant insults, if the only thing you can find wrong with >>> the technical discussion is a typographical error, then you agree, Chris. >>

You commented on the four or five other errors I found.

Hi Chris,

I explained how iOS contacts work with respect to inherent privacy flaws.

All you ever do when you attempt to refute facts, is you say all facts are wrong, but you never seem to show any indication you know how it works.

It was clear to me, from what you wrote, you have no idea how it works.

Hence, you just claiming everything is wrong without explaining how you
think it works, is not something that anyone can possibly discuss with you.

It's impossible to have iOS contacts privacy due to stated privacy flaws. >>

False.

I explained very clearly where iOS contacts privacy is impossible, Chris.
For you to simply say 'false', means you actually agree with me, Chris.

They are private. You are simply wrong.

But I won't be hard on you as it's clear you have no idea how contacts
work, so I think you're just saying "false" because you don't like that I shoed that it's impossible (as far as we know) to have iOS contacts
privacy.

You cannot have per-contact privacy. It is all-or-nothing.

Note, it's very clear, to me, which I explained in earlier threads and on
the Android newsgroup, that iOS contacts are certainly "more private" than Android contacts, out of the box.

What is clear -- to you -- is not tied to reality.

But while you can easily make Android contacts private, it's impossible to make iOS contacts private (unless, of course, you jailbreak the device).

Or just use it as designed and they are private unless you give permissions
(or some zero day exploit).
--
It's impossible for someone who is at war with themselves to be at peace with you.
--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2