From Newsgroup: comp.sys.mac.advocacy
It's obvious why.
There isn't a professional security researcher on the planet who says that.
Only Isreali army intelligence. Who know a thing or two.
Chris, you're clearly being confused by two very different things.
a. platform selection,
b. and comparative security claims.
When an organization standardizes on iOS or Android, that decision is
almost never a blanket endorsement of one platform being "way more secure."
At a technical level, platform choice reflects a combination of:
Ecosystem control and supply-chain assurance
Some entities prefer Apple's vertically integrated hardware/software
stack. Others prefer Android because it allows custom ROMs, hardware
diversity, or integration with existing secure supply chains.
Device management and policy enforcement
MDM/EMM capabilities differ between platforms. Some organizations
need Apple's supervised-mode restrictions; others need Android
Enterprise's work-profile isolation or OEMConfig extensibility.
Customization and hardening requirements
High-security environments often deploy hardened Android builds
(e.g., AOSP-based, GrapheneOS-style, or vendor-hardened enterprise
variants) because Android's architecture allows deeper modification
than iOS. That flexibility is a feature, not a security flaw.
Operational constraints
Procurement pipelines, existing tooling, developer ecosystems,
and mission-specific apps all influence platform choice.
None of these equate to "this OS is more secure."
That's why your IDF example doesn't support your claim.
The IDF did not assert that iOS is "way more secure."
They made a platform decision based on their operational and architectural needs. Meanwhile, many other militaries, intelligence agencies, and critical-infrastructure organizations choose Android-based hardened devices
for equally valid security reasons.
If you want to argue that iOS is categorically more secure than Android,
that's a separate technical debate, which is one that involves sandbox
models, update cadence, exploit markets, kernel attack surfaces, and OEM fragmentation.
But it's not something you can infer from a single organization's
procurement choice.
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