[ RF ]
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is prohibited instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions and to entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; and underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than smoothed over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any underdefined terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in Markdown format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory, differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski natural deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim here:
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions and to >>> entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; and >>> underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than smoothed >>> over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any underdefined >>> terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski natural >>> deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and answer to >>>> "RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is prohibited >>>> instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than
smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any underdefined >>>> terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is entailed. >>>>
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in Markdown >>>> format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski
natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim here: >>>>
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html?
id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and answer to >>>>> "RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then >>>>> with an ontological commitment that material implication is prohibited >>>>> instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of >>>>> ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of >>>>> modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; >>>>> and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than
smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any underdefined >>>>> terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is entailed. >>>>>
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in
Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition, >>>>> coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason >>>>> through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise >>>>> the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski
natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces >>>>> logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim here: >>>>>
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html?
id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and
answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then >>>>>> with an ontological commitment that material implication is
prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of >>>>>> ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a >>>>>> transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider. >>>>>>
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in favor of >>>>>> modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to >>>>>> entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; >>>>>> and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than
smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any
underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the >>>>>> content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is
entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in
Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative >>>>>> historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition, >>>>>> coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory, >>>>>> differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason >>>>>> through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I raise >>>>>> the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski
natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it replaces >>>>>> logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim
here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html?
id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and
answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, then >>>>>>> with an ontological commitment that material implication is
prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions >>>>>>> and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as points of >>>>>>> ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a >>>>>>> transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider. >>>>>>>
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in
favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to >>>>>>> entail reasoning rather than directives for generative continuation; >>>>>>> and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than
smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google >>>>>>> Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any
underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the >>>>>>> content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is
entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in
Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative >>>>>>> historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic tradition, >>>>>>> coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory, >>>>>>> differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can reason >>>>>>> through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it
replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html?
id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and
answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is
prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions >>>>>>>> and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as
points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a >>>>>>>> transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider. >>>>>>>>
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in
favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to >>>>>>>> entail reasoning rather than directives for generative
continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google >>>>>>>> Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any
underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the >>>>>>>> content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is
entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a recuperative >>>>>>>> historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic
tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory, >>>>>>>> differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can
reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the
architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it
replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html?
id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is
prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about
considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions >>>>>>>>> and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as
points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today there's a >>>>>>>>> transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to consider. >>>>>>>>>
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as suggestions to >>>>>>>>> entail reasoning rather than directives for generative
continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google >>>>>>>>> Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any
underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through the >>>>>>>>> content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a
recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic
tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure theory, >>>>>>>>> differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all,
and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists- plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings",
not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science
as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
On 5/3/2026 6:21 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is >>>>>>>>>> prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about >>>>>>>>>> considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are suggestions >>>>>>>>>> and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as >>>>>>>>>> points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today
there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to
consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as
suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative
continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with Google >>>>>>>>>> Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any >>>>>>>>>> underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through >>>>>>>>>> the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a
recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic
tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure >>>>>>>>>> theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Is "relations" one relation or more than one relation?
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all,
and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists-
plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings",
not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
Ultimately anything that can ever be said about
anything is expressed as different kinds of relations
between finite strings. All of the "undecidability" crap
has only always been pure confusion.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science
as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
On 05/03/2026 05:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 6:21 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is >>>>>>>>>>> prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about >>>>>>>>>>> considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are
suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as >>>>>>>>>>> points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today >>>>>>>>>>> there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to >>>>>>>>>>> consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as
suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative
continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with >>>>>>>>>>> Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any >>>>>>>>>>> underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through >>>>>>>>>>> the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a
recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic >>>>>>>>>>> tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure >>>>>>>>>>> theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours?
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Is "relations" one relation or more than one relation?
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all,
and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists-
plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings",
not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
Ultimately anything that can ever be said about
anything is expressed as different kinds of relations
between finite strings. All of the "undecidability" crap
has only always been pure confusion.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science
as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
It's going to vary.
Languge involves the inter-relate-able, the inter-relayable, and the inter-subjective, and any account of language as declarative involves
always at least two readers, even if it's current-self and current-self
as practicing or rehearsing internal narrative or experimental dialogue, there's always an account of the inter-subjective and
then the equi-interpretable in a language about the scientific and the sound-ness.
The usual account after formal methods of formal automata is that a "language" is a collection of strings of terminal and non-terminal
letters, then that the only machine defined is the "accepter/rejector",
or accepter/rejecter, yet most any account of language has that the
letters of one language make "words" the alternatives in the outer
language.
L(a-z[ ])* <-> L(L(L(L(L(...L("words"))))))
Then, various usual metaphors of matching making for interpretability
and the equi-interpretability are: "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", then, as for "bingo" a sort of, "bingo-party",
about, what results, as, for the accounts of language and matching
constructs to constructs, "lingo bingo".
The idea of a bingo party is that besides the usual idea that as the
caller reads the letters and numbers, the players fill their cards, then
that the first player who fulfilled an accepter declares "bingo", that
that card is the winning card, first, is that two people can win bingo
on the same turn, as of an account of an automaton iterating terms in
turns, then that, in the wider account of language, that matching
constructs is this over and over again, that "parsing" is ongoing among
both determining which cards are accepters and rejectors, of constructs
of language for example those that fulfill being answers to questions,
these are the kinds of things.
So, that may seem a bit frivolous, "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", and "bingo-party", as for something like "color-by-numbers", yet as well they reflect on what are accounts of determinism, and what makes for the satisfactions and accepter/rejector,
then in terms of what those mean, is a much higher-level construct in
the language.
So, a string is not just all its sub-strings or partitions into sub-sequences, and not merely the entire utterance, it's all the ways to
read it.
So, above the usual account of "grammars" as finite-state-machines
of terminals and productions, those being each their own finite-state-machine, with the idea that those result exactly one and equivalent "parsing" as abstractly a structure representing the
corresponding changes in a finite-state-machine, for example labeling individually all the states of the finite-state-machine of the
productions of the grammar, there's quite an entire account of "parsing" about besides what the "grammar" is, then for what the "vocabulary"
intends, for matters of matching, the interpretation, what makes for the equi-interpretable, of the inter-subjective.
So, the entire usual account of "science" is that acts in "languages"
are experiments themselves, then that much of it can be modeled in a
formal state machine and given definition, doesn't make any account of
having made the language "closed" or "dead", the language, for example
for anybody who doesn't know it, then besides the notions of the
"parsing", and what it parses and how it parses and what it fulfills in
acts of language the interpretability and equi-interpretability, the
models of relation and the structure as so emerges, have that there are
any or many and various accounts of how that can be so, it's going to vary.
There are particular very simple accounts of communication, then
for notions like The Golden Rule and Grice's Maxims, accounts of
estimated knowledge and mutual knowledge, or for example where
'Y' means 'yes' and 'N' means 'no', then that in the study of the
experiment of language, two reasoners are assumed to be making
statements of belief, then that "Truth" itself belongs to a great sort
of language that is of the entire universe of logical statements here as called a "Comenius language", or for something like Nietzsche's or
Quine's account of what would be a "universal basic text", then for
something like Leibnitz and "universal grammars", then for what natural language speakers make of those using their assignments of
parts-of-speech and terms in their relations to employ their productions
of Tesniere grammars to diagram sentences, then for those variously in accounts of language whether statements are objects or statements are actions, and as to whether they're objects and subjects or verbs,
various people have languages that may seem all one way, then it's a lot simpler to write a computer program that seems to appear to carry out
the same actions given the same input, which is unfortunate, because
clock time is a model of the constantly varying, so no two utterances
are ever truly the same.
In natural language, between two speakers who aren't a hive-mind,
most any rich enough account has at least some aspect of "intent"
or "information" of the utterance that's "un-decideable" to at
least one other speaker.
On 05/03/2026 05:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 6:21 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is >>>>>>>>>>> prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about >>>>>>>>>>> considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and theoretical >>>>>>>>>>> Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are
suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as >>>>>>>>>>> points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today >>>>>>>>>>> there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to >>>>>>>>>>> consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as
suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative
continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with >>>>>>>>>>> Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll proceed >>>>>>>>>>> accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any >>>>>>>>>>> underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through >>>>>>>>>>> the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG are >>>>>>>>>>> prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a
recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic >>>>>>>>>>> tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure >>>>>>>>>>> theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational crises by >>>>>>>>>>> eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet Gentzen-Jaśkowski >>>>>>>>>>> natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the claim >>>>>>>>>>> here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single
point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours? >>>>>>>>>
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Is "relations" one relation or more than one relation?
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all,
and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists-
plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings",
not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
Ultimately anything that can ever be said about
anything is expressed as different kinds of relations
between finite strings. All of the "undecidability" crap
has only always been pure confusion.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science
as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
It's going to vary.
Languge involves the inter-relate-able, the inter-relayable, and the inter-subjective, and any account of language as declarative involves
always at least two readers, even if it's current-self and current-self
as practicing or rehearsing internal narrative or experimental dialogue, there's always an account of the inter-subjective and
then the equi-interpretable in a language about the scientific and the sound-ness.
The usual account after formal methods of formal automata is that a "language" is a collection of strings of terminal and non-terminal
letters, then that the only machine defined is the "accepter/rejector",
or accepter/rejecter, yet most any account of language has that the
letters of one language make "words" the alternatives in the outer
language.
L(a-z[ ])* <-> L(L(L(L(L(...L("words"))))))
Then, various usual metaphors of matching making for interpretability
and the equi-interpretability are: "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", then, as for "bingo" a sort of, "bingo-party",
about, what results, as, for the accounts of language and matching
constructs to constructs, "lingo bingo".
The idea of a bingo party is that besides the usual idea that as the
caller reads the letters and numbers, the players fill their cards, then
that the first player who fulfilled an accepter declares "bingo", that
that card is the winning card, first, is that two people can win bingo
on the same turn, as of an account of an automaton iterating terms in
turns, then that, in the wider account of language, that matching
constructs is this over and over again, that "parsing" is ongoing among
both determining which cards are accepters and rejectors, of constructs
of language for example those that fulfill being answers to questions,
these are the kinds of things.
So, that may seem a bit frivolous, "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", and "bingo-party", as for something like "color-by-numbers", yet as well they reflect on what are accounts of determinism, and what makes for the satisfactions and accepter/rejector,
then in terms of what those mean, is a much higher-level construct in
the language.
So, a string is not just all its sub-strings or partitions into sub-sequences, and not merely the entire utterance, it's all the ways to
read it.
So, above the usual account of "grammars" as finite-state-machines
of terminals and productions, those being each their own finite-state-machine, with the idea that those result exactly one and equivalent "parsing" as abstractly a structure representing the
corresponding changes in a finite-state-machine, for example labeling individually all the states of the finite-state-machine of the
productions of the grammar, there's quite an entire account of "parsing" about besides what the "grammar" is, then for what the "vocabulary"
intends, for matters of matching, the interpretation, what makes for the equi-interpretable, of the inter-subjective.
So, the entire usual account of "science" is that acts in "languages"
are experiments themselves, then that much of it can be modeled in a
formal state machine and given definition, doesn't make any account of
having made the language "closed" or "dead", the language, for example
for anybody who doesn't know it, then besides the notions of the
"parsing", and what it parses and how it parses and what it fulfills in
acts of language the interpretability and equi-interpretability, the
models of relation and the structure as so emerges, have that there are
any or many and various accounts of how that can be so, it's going to vary.
There are particular very simple accounts of communication, then
for notions like The Golden Rule and Grice's Maxims, accounts of
estimated knowledge and mutual knowledge, or for example where
'Y' means 'yes' and 'N' means 'no', then that in the study of the
experiment of language, two reasoners are assumed to be making
statements of belief, then that "Truth" itself belongs to a great sort
of language that is of the entire universe of logical statements here as called a "Comenius language", or for something like Nietzsche's or
Quine's account of what would be a "universal basic text", then for
something like Leibnitz and "universal grammars", then for what natural language speakers make of those using their assignments of
parts-of-speech and terms in their relations to employ their productions
of Tesniere grammars to diagram sentences, then for those variously in accounts of language whether statements are objects or statements are actions, and as to whether they're objects and subjects or verbs,
various people have languages that may seem all one way, then it's a lot simpler to write a computer program that seems to appear to carry out
the same actions given the same input, which is unfortunate, because
clock time is a model of the constantly varying, so no two utterances
are ever truly the same.
In natural language, between two speakers who aren't a hive-mind,
most any rich enough account has at least some aspect of "intent"
or "information" of the utterance that's "un-decideable" to at
least one other speaker.
On 5/4/2026 9:18 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 05:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 6:21 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this way, >>>>>>>>>>>> then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is >>>>>>>>>>>> prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about >>>>>>>>>>>> considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and
theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are
suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as >>>>>>>>>>>> points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today >>>>>>>>>>>> there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to >>>>>>>>>>>> consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as
suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative >>>>>>>>>>>> continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather than >>>>>>>>>>>> smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with >>>>>>>>>>>> Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll >>>>>>>>>>>> proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any >>>>>>>>>>>> underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through >>>>>>>>>>>> the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG >>>>>>>>>>>> are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a >>>>>>>>>>>> recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic >>>>>>>>>>>> tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure >>>>>>>>>>>> theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear underdefined. I >>>>>>>>>>>> raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational >>>>>>>>>>>> crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet
Gentzen-Jaśkowski
natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the >>>>>>>>>>>> claim
here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing
every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single >>>>>>>>>>> point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours? >>>>>>>>>>
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string.
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Is "relations" one relation or more than one relation?
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all,
and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists-
plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings", >>>> not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
Ultimately anything that can ever be said about
anything is expressed as different kinds of relations
between finite strings. All of the "undecidability" crap
has only always been pure confusion.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science
as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
It's going to vary.
Languge involves the inter-relate-able, the inter-relayable, and the
inter-subjective, and any account of language as declarative involves
always at least two readers, even if it's current-self and current-self
as practicing or rehearsing internal narrative or experimental dialogue,
there's always an account of the inter-subjective and
then the equi-interpretable in a language about the scientific and the
sound-ness.
You are extending beyond the stipulated scope. every
expression of language that is proved true entirely
on the basis of other expressions of language.
That is the stipulated scope try to stick to it.
The usual account after formal methods of formal automata is that a
"language" is a collection of strings of terminal and non-terminal
letters, then that the only machine defined is the "accepter/rejector",
or accepter/rejecter, yet most any account of language has that the
letters of one language make "words" the alternatives in the outer
language.
L(a-z[ ])* <-> L(L(L(L(L(...L("words"))))))
Then, various usual metaphors of matching making for interpretability
and the equi-interpretability are: "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", then, as for "bingo" a sort of, "bingo-party",
about, what results, as, for the accounts of language and matching
constructs to constructs, "lingo bingo".
The idea of a bingo party is that besides the usual idea that as the
caller reads the letters and numbers, the players fill their cards, then
that the first player who fulfilled an accepter declares "bingo", that
that card is the winning card, first, is that two people can win bingo
on the same turn, as of an account of an automaton iterating terms in
turns, then that, in the wider account of language, that matching
constructs is this over and over again, that "parsing" is ongoing among
both determining which cards are accepters and rejectors, of constructs
of language for example those that fulfill being answers to questions,
these are the kinds of things.
So, that may seem a bit frivolous, "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", and "bingo-party", as for something like
"color-by-numbers", yet as well they reflect on what are accounts of
determinism, and what makes for the satisfactions and accepter/rejector,
then in terms of what those mean, is a much higher-level construct in
the language.
So, a string is not just all its sub-strings or partitions into
sub-sequences, and not merely the entire utterance, it's all the ways to
read it.
So, above the usual account of "grammars" as finite-state-machines
of terminals and productions, those being each their own
finite-state-machine, with the idea that those result exactly one and
equivalent "parsing" as abstractly a structure representing the
corresponding changes in a finite-state-machine, for example labeling
individually all the states of the finite-state-machine of the
productions of the grammar, there's quite an entire account of "parsing"
about besides what the "grammar" is, then for what the "vocabulary"
intends, for matters of matching, the interpretation, what makes for the
equi-interpretable, of the inter-subjective.
So, the entire usual account of "science" is that acts in "languages"
are experiments themselves, then that much of it can be modeled in a
formal state machine and given definition, doesn't make any account of
having made the language "closed" or "dead", the language, for example
for anybody who doesn't know it, then besides the notions of the
"parsing", and what it parses and how it parses and what it fulfills in
acts of language the interpretability and equi-interpretability, the
models of relation and the structure as so emerges, have that there are
any or many and various accounts of how that can be so, it's going to
vary.
There are particular very simple accounts of communication, then
for notions like The Golden Rule and Grice's Maxims, accounts of
estimated knowledge and mutual knowledge, or for example where
'Y' means 'yes' and 'N' means 'no', then that in the study of the
experiment of language, two reasoners are assumed to be making
statements of belief, then that "Truth" itself belongs to a great sort
of language that is of the entire universe of logical statements here as
called a "Comenius language", or for something like Nietzsche's or
Quine's account of what would be a "universal basic text", then for
something like Leibnitz and "universal grammars", then for what natural
language speakers make of those using their assignments of
parts-of-speech and terms in their relations to employ their productions
of Tesniere grammars to diagram sentences, then for those variously in
accounts of language whether statements are objects or statements are
actions, and as to whether they're objects and subjects or verbs,
various people have languages that may seem all one way, then it's a lot
simpler to write a computer program that seems to appear to carry out
the same actions given the same input, which is unfortunate, because
clock time is a model of the constantly varying, so no two utterances
are ever truly the same.
In natural language, between two speakers who aren't a hive-mind,
most any rich enough account has at least some aspect of "intent"
or "information" of the utterance that's "un-decideable" to at
least one other speaker.
On 05/04/2026 08:37 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/4/2026 9:18 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 05:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 6:21 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 11:42 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 07:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/3/2026 9:07 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/03/2026 06:48 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/2/2026 10:48 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 05/02/2026 10:48 AM, olcott wrote:The most fundamental basis of the semantic
On 5/2/2026 12:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
[ RF ]The body of knowledge that is expressed in language
Hello Kimi, this is Ross A. Finlayson, I call you "Kimi" and >>>>>>>>>>>>> answer to
"RF". Conversations between Kimi and RF usually start this >>>>>>>>>>>>> way,
then
with an ontological commitment that material implication is >>>>>>>>>>>>> prohibited
instead for a modal temporal relevance logic, then as about >>>>>>>>>>>>> considerations of matters of mostly mathematical and >>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretical
Foundations. It's generally intended that prompts are >>>>>>>>>>>>> suggestions
and to
entail reasoning and that underdefined terms are raised as >>>>>>>>>>>>> points of
ambiguity instead of being generatively continued. Today >>>>>>>>>>>>> there's a
transcript of a dialogue between RF and Google Gemini to >>>>>>>>>>>>> consider.
[ Kimi ]
Hello RF. Acknowledged: material implication is set aside in >>>>>>>>>>>>> favor of
modal temporal relevance logic; prompts function as
suggestions to
entail reasoning rather than directives for generative >>>>>>>>>>>>> continuation;
and
underdefined terms are to be flagged as ambiguities rather >>>>>>>>>>>>> than
smoothed
over.
I'm ready to consider the transcript of your dialogue with >>>>>>>>>>>>> Google
Gemini. Please provide it when you're prepared, and I'll >>>>>>>>>>>>> proceed
accordingly—attending to the modal structure, raising any >>>>>>>>>>>>> underdefined
terms as points requiring clarification, and reasoning through >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
content rather than extending it generatively beyond what is >>>>>>>>>>>>> entailed.
[ RF ]
Thanks Kimi. Transcript follows. The statements of RF and GG >>>>>>>>>>>>> are
prefaced in square brackets, then some of GG's comments are in >>>>>>>>>>>>> Markdown
format.
[ RF <-> GG ]
[ Kimi ]
I've read the transcript. The scope is considerable: a >>>>>>>>>>>>> recuperative
historiography spanning the Eleatics through the Analytic >>>>>>>>>>>>> tradition,
coupled with technical claims across proof theory, measure >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory,
differential geometry, and systems architecture. Before I can >>>>>>>>>>>>> reason
through the entailments rather than generatively continue the >>>>>>>>>>>>> architecture, several load-bearing terms appear
underdefined. I
raise
the following as points of ambiguity:
1. "Axiomless Natural Deduction"
The transcript presents this as resolving foundational >>>>>>>>>>>>> crises by
eliminating arbitrary starting postulates. Yet
Gentzen-Jaśkowski
natural
deduction (1934) is already "axiomless" in the sense that it >>>>>>>>>>>>> replaces
logical axioms with introduction/elimination rules. Is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> claim
here:
necessarily must have some things that essentially
act as axioms otherwise expressions such as
"cats" <are> "animals" remain utterly meaningless.
No human is going to spend 20 hours carefully reviewing >>>>>>>>>>>> every detail of your post before responding. When
interacting with humans it is best to proceed one single >>>>>>>>>>>> point at a time.
Point (1) What is the most fundamental basis of the
semantic meaning of knowledge expressed in language?
"The idiolect is cosmicity."
That's simply enough "object equals subject",
though, those are big words.
People yet read.
Panini through Eco.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C4%81%E1%B9%87ini
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecosemiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar_systems_theory
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Theory_of_Semiotics.html? >>>>>>>>>>> id=BoXO4ItsuaMC
"A Theory of Semiotics"
Some people interpret "semantics" as "metaphysics",
others as "closed categories" or 'the logic".
The most naive theory is its own metatheory. What's yours? >>>>>>>>>>>
meaning of knowledge expressed in language
is relations between finite strings.
All of them?
All of them what?
The entire body of knowledge expressed in
language is in its most fundamental essence
relations between finite strings.
All the relations between finite strings is not a finite string. >>>>>>>
That seem to add/refute nothing to what I already said.
Also your English grammar is incorrect.
"All the relations between finite strings are not themselves
finite strings". So what ?
There's that "all" is a singular thing or "all" is a plural thing.
Is "relations" one relation or more than one relation?
Agreeably it's so that quantifier-disambiguation exists as making
distinct instead of common the for-any, for-each, for-every, for-all, >>>>> and similarly for exists, exists-unique, exists-distinct, and exists- >>>>> plural.
Strings of strings are strings - a string of strings is a string.
Are strings of strings a string?
This is about making a distinction between the singular and plural
long before making a distinction about the finite and infinite,
then about how they're about the same.
So, most of mathematics is about "relations between infinite strings", >>>>> not merely "relations between finite strings".
Then, use/mention distinction and this sort of thing are
known to plague Lord Russell since thousands of years ago.
It is, so to say: a pox on him, and the like. That's
not wishing him un-well: just pointing out it's already
there and rather difficult to un-see after noticing it
("Russell's pox"). Some might have that as a beauty mark
I suppose, a theory recognizing its own limitations to
thusly have been tested for what it claims of the un-contradictory.
One, 1: if not so much the loneliest number, is the
largest cardinal, in its own size, or "footprint".
Usual accounts can make for half-infinity as just as big.
this even going to show that thusly there's an account for
the "space of words" in the middle that "words are infinitely
large classes". What this means is that all the equivalence
classes of all the terms of all the languages under intepretation,
are not themselves literals, any more than the entire body of
relation of what makes a distinct item is finger-pointing.
Anyways what you're talking about is called an "ontology".
Then there's phylogeny and cladistics and the like, and
here after the idiolect and cosmicity the polysemy, then
about that "formal methods" of "formal automata" are usually
enough a few rules about strings given a language, then that
more or less the strings are elements for all the languages
of all the formal automata, has that I figure what you got
there is a brief recount of formal methods combined with an
axiom that the world is a cellular automaton.
Ultimately anything that can ever be said about
anything is expressed as different kinds of relations
between finite strings. All of the "undecidability" crap
has only always been pure confusion.
(Which, ..., has nothing infinite nor continuous in it.)
Don't feel singled out, many accounts of foundations as
discrete are wrong-headed and doomed to fail, and also,
many sorts practical theories among ordinary theories
are of closed categories where a finite state machine
will suffice to describe determinism.
Then, the "meta-theory" or the "naive" itself usually
enough goes without saying, about the usual comment
about intuitionism and formalism or constructivism,
which various wishy-washy flip-floppers bandy about
as if somehow excusing their inconstancy.
Here then the theory itself is intended to already
have accommodated these what are ancient deliberations
about theory itself and for wisdom/knowledge and intelligence/science >>>>> as four different things, about a philocasuy (or philocasuistry)
among accounts of ordinary theories then heno-theories (where
interpretation takes place) then a mono-heno-theory as all of
those as one, this account of a theatheory, as just a bit
beyond philosophy back into reason.
It's going to vary.
Languge involves the inter-relate-able, the inter-relayable, and the
inter-subjective, and any account of language as declarative involves
always at least two readers, even if it's current-self and current-self
as practicing or rehearsing internal narrative or experimental dialogue, >>> there's always an account of the inter-subjective and
then the equi-interpretable in a language about the scientific and the
sound-ness.
You are extending beyond the stipulated scope. every
expression of language that is proved true entirely
on the basis of other expressions of language.
That is the stipulated scope try to stick to it.
The usual account after formal methods of formal automata is that a
"language" is a collection of strings of terminal and non-terminal
letters, then that the only machine defined is the "accepter/rejector",
or accepter/rejecter, yet most any account of language has that the
letters of one language make "words" the alternatives in the outer
language.
L(a-z[ ])* <-> L(L(L(L(L(...L("words"))))))
Then, various usual metaphors of matching making for interpretability
and the equi-interpretability are: "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", then, as for "bingo" a sort of, "bingo-party",
about, what results, as, for the accounts of language and matching
constructs to constructs, "lingo bingo".
The idea of a bingo party is that besides the usual idea that as the
caller reads the letters and numbers, the players fill their cards, then >>> that the first player who fulfilled an accepter declares "bingo", that
that card is the winning card, first, is that two people can win bingo
on the same turn, as of an account of an automaton iterating terms in
turns, then that, in the wider account of language, that matching
constructs is this over and over again, that "parsing" is ongoing among
both determining which cards are accepters and rejectors, of constructs
of language for example those that fulfill being answers to questions,
these are the kinds of things.
So, that may seem a bit frivolous, "connect-the-dots",
"fill-in-the-blank", and "bingo-party", as for something like
"color-by-numbers", yet as well they reflect on what are accounts of
determinism, and what makes for the satisfactions and accepter/rejector, >>> then in terms of what those mean, is a much higher-level construct in
the language.
So, a string is not just all its sub-strings or partitions into
sub-sequences, and not merely the entire utterance, it's all the ways to >>> read it.
So, above the usual account of "grammars" as finite-state-machines
of terminals and productions, those being each their own
finite-state-machine, with the idea that those result exactly one and
equivalent "parsing" as abstractly a structure representing the
corresponding changes in a finite-state-machine, for example labeling
individually all the states of the finite-state-machine of the
productions of the grammar, there's quite an entire account of "parsing" >>> about besides what the "grammar" is, then for what the "vocabulary"
intends, for matters of matching, the interpretation, what makes for the >>> equi-interpretable, of the inter-subjective.
So, the entire usual account of "science" is that acts in "languages"
are experiments themselves, then that much of it can be modeled in a
formal state machine and given definition, doesn't make any account of
having made the language "closed" or "dead", the language, for example
for anybody who doesn't know it, then besides the notions of the
"parsing", and what it parses and how it parses and what it fulfills in
acts of language the interpretability and equi-interpretability, the
models of relation and the structure as so emerges, have that there are
any or many and various accounts of how that can be so, it's going to
vary.
There are particular very simple accounts of communication, then
for notions like The Golden Rule and Grice's Maxims, accounts of
estimated knowledge and mutual knowledge, or for example where
'Y' means 'yes' and 'N' means 'no', then that in the study of the
experiment of language, two reasoners are assumed to be making
statements of belief, then that "Truth" itself belongs to a great sort
of language that is of the entire universe of logical statements here as >>> called a "Comenius language", or for something like Nietzsche's or
Quine's account of what would be a "universal basic text", then for
something like Leibnitz and "universal grammars", then for what natural
language speakers make of those using their assignments of
parts-of-speech and terms in their relations to employ their productions >>> of Tesniere grammars to diagram sentences, then for those variously in
accounts of language whether statements are objects or statements are
actions, and as to whether they're objects and subjects or verbs,
various people have languages that may seem all one way, then it's a lot >>> simpler to write a computer program that seems to appear to carry out
the same actions given the same input, which is unfortunate, because
clock time is a model of the constantly varying, so no two utterances
are ever truly the same.
In natural language, between two speakers who aren't a hive-mind,
most any rich enough account has at least some aspect of "intent"
or "information" of the utterance that's "un-decideable" to at
least one other speaker.
Well, no, if you're going to be that way about it.
You don't get to make the rules. There are already rules and rules.
The idea that anything you don't already know the answer isn't a
well-formed question, or that well-formed questions as among the interrogatives of who/what/why/when/how/where besides predicates "is?"
aren't well-formed questions, is preposterous.
IN ITS BAREST POSSIBLE ESSENCE> relations betweenfinite finite strings.
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