Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation for how
you distinguish sufficient justification from mere justification. Adding
an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless you can explain what is
meant by it.
André
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation for
how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere justification.
Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless you can explain
what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation for
how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere justification.
Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless you can explain
what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real-life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that the earth is
the third planet orbiting the sun is part of "knowledge". So presumably
you believe that there is a sufficient justification for believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century it was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient justification to hold
this view (light had been observed to have properties associated with
waves and all waves known until then required some sort of medium
through which to propegate). However, it turns out that this belief is
false which presumably means the justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status as the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for the
luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth Century insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the fact that the
one view is true and the other false since, in empirical domains, our assessment of what is true doesn't come from a position of omniscience
but is based purely on what we feel can be justified.
André
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation for
how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless
you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with
knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real-life
example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that the earth
is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of "knowledge". So
presumably you believe that there is a sufficient justification for
believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century it
was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the
luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have
properties associated with waves and all waves known until then
required some sort of medium through which to propegate). However, it
turns out that this belief is false which presumably means the
justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status as
the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for the
luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth Century
insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the fact that
the one view is true and the other false since, in empirical domains,
our assessment of what is true doesn't come from a position of
omniscience but is based purely on what we feel can be justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
On 2026-06-20 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation for >>>>> how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless
you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with
knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real-
life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that the
earth is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of "knowledge". So
presumably you believe that there is a sufficient justification for
believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century it
was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the
luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have
properties associated with waves and all waves known until then
required some sort of medium through which to propegate). However, it
turns out that this belief is false which presumably means the
justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status as
the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for the
luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth Century
insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the fact that
the one view is true and the other false since, in empirical domains,
our assessment of what is true doesn't come from a position of
omniscience but is based purely on what we feel can be justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
No, it really isn't since the notion of 'sufficient' is already implicit
in the term 'justification' (as evidenced by the fact that you'll often
find the expression 'insufficient justification' used by
epistemologists, including in the article which you cited), so you
aren't adding anything new here.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
I'd like to consider myself a reasonable person, and I can see no reason
to dismiss the justification in the Gettier case as insufficient. One of
his premises turned out to be wrong, but his justification seems warranted.
André
On 6/20/2026 10:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation
for how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless >>>>>> you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with
knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real-
life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that the
earth is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of "knowledge".
So presumably you believe that there is a sufficient justification
for believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century it
was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the
luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have
properties associated with waves and all waves known until then
required some sort of medium through which to propegate). However,
it turns out that this belief is false which presumably means the
justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status as
the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for the
luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth Century
insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the fact that
the one view is true and the other false since, in empirical
domains, our assessment of what is true doesn't come from a position
of omniscience but is based purely on what we feel can be justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
No, it really isn't since the notion of 'sufficient' is already
implicit in the term 'justification' (as evidenced by the fact that
you'll often find the expression 'insufficient justification' used by
epistemologists, including in the article which you cited), so you
aren't adding anything new here.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
I'd like to consider myself a reasonable person, and I can see no
reason to dismiss the justification in the Gettier case as
insufficient. One of his premises turned out to be wrong, but his
justification seems warranted.
André
Within this context you seem to prove insincere:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has
ten coins in their pocket."
Because everyone knows the truism that ten coins in
the pocket necessitates getting the job.
On 2026-06-20 21:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation >>>>>>> for how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem unless >>>>>>> you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with
knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real-
life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that the >>>>> earth is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of "knowledge".
So presumably you believe that there is a sufficient justification
for believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century
it was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the
luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have
properties associated with waves and all waves known until then
required some sort of medium through which to propegate). However,
it turns out that this belief is false which presumably means the
justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status
as the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for the >>>>> luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth Century >>>>> insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the fact that >>>>> the one view is true and the other false since, in empirical
domains, our assessment of what is true doesn't come from a
position of omniscience but is based purely on what we feel can be
justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
No, it really isn't since the notion of 'sufficient' is already
implicit in the term 'justification' (as evidenced by the fact that
you'll often find the expression 'insufficient justification' used by
epistemologists, including in the article which you cited), so you
aren't adding anything new here.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
I'd like to consider myself a reasonable person, and I can see no
reason to dismiss the justification in the Gettier case as
insufficient. One of his premises turned out to be wrong, but his
justification seems warranted.
André
Within this context you seem to prove insincere:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has
ten coins in their pocket."
Because everyone knows the truism that ten coins in
the pocket necessitates getting the job.
Nothing in his belief implied that getting ten coins would cause or otherwise necessitate someone getting a job. His belief was that the
person who ended up getting the job would have ten coins in his pocket. You've got your conditionals all mixed up.
André
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
On 6/20/2026 10:42 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation >>>>>>>> for how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem
unless you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with >>>>>> knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a real- >>>>>> life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact that
the earth is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of
"knowledge". So presumably you believe that there is a sufficient >>>>>> justification for believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century >>>>>> it was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the
luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have
properties associated with waves and all waves known until then
required some sort of medium through which to propegate). However, >>>>>> it turns out that this belief is false which presumably means the >>>>>> justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status >>>>>> as the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for
the luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth
Century insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the >>>>>> fact that the one view is true and the other false since, in
empirical domains, our assessment of what is true doesn't come
from a position of omniscience but is based purely on what we feel >>>>>> can be justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
No, it really isn't since the notion of 'sufficient' is already
implicit in the term 'justification' (as evidenced by the fact that
you'll often find the expression 'insufficient justification' used
by epistemologists, including in the article which you cited), so
you aren't adding anything new here.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
I'd like to consider myself a reasonable person, and I can see no
reason to dismiss the justification in the Gettier case as
insufficient. One of his premises turned out to be wrong, but his
justification seems warranted.
André
Within this context you seem to prove insincere:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has
ten coins in their pocket."
Because everyone knows the truism that ten coins in
the pocket necessitates getting the job.
Nothing in his belief implied that getting ten coins would cause or
otherwise necessitate someone getting a job. His belief was that the
person who ended up getting the job would have ten coins in his
pocket. You've got your conditionals all mixed up.
André
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:42 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 20:49, olcott wrote:
On 6/20/2026 9:27 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 18:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
That's not a solution unless you have some coherent explanation >>>>>>>>> for how you distinguish sufficient justification from mere
justification. Adding an adjective doesn't solve a problem
unless you can explain what is meant by it.
André
In each of the Gettier cases it is clear that the
justification was insufficient.
Clear by what criterion?
This by itself
tosses them out. An additional elaboration could
define exactly what "sufficient" means. This does
not seem absolutely required.
We could pass this off the way the courts have and
say that a sufficient justification is whatever a
reasonable person would say that it is.
For analytical truth (my specialty) a sufficient
justification is whatever makes the belief necessarily
true. Anything else is insufficient.
Gettier wasn't dealing with analytical truth. He was dealing with >>>>>>> knowlege.
Why don't you try to explain your position with respect to a
real- life example. In a previous post you claimed that the fact >>>>>>> that the earth is the third planet orbiting the sun is part of
"knowledge". So presumably you believe that there is a sufficient >>>>>>> justification for believing that. What is that justification?
Contrast that with another example. During the Nineteenth Century >>>>>>> it was widely accepted that there existed a substance called the >>>>>>> luminiferous aether, and scientists felt they had sufficient
justification to hold this view (light had been observed to have >>>>>>> properties associated with waves and all waves known until then >>>>>>> required some sort of medium through which to propegate).
However, it turns out that this belief is false which presumably >>>>>>> means the justification was not actually sufficient.
So what makes your justification for accepting the earth's status >>>>>>> as the third planet sufficient, but makes the justification for >>>>>>> the luminiferous aether which was offered during the Nineteenth >>>>>>> Century insufficient? Note that you can't base your answer on the >>>>>>> fact that the one view is true and the other false since, in
empirical domains, our assessment of what is true doesn't come
from a position of omniscience but is based purely on what we
feel can be justified.
André
Knowledge as a sufficiently justified true belief
is clearly an incremental improvement to justified
true belief.
No, it really isn't since the notion of 'sufficient' is already
implicit in the term 'justification' (as evidenced by the fact that >>>>> you'll often find the expression 'insufficient justification' used
by epistemologists, including in the article which you cited), so
you aren't adding anything new here.
A reasonable person would agree that none of the
Gettier cases is there a sufficient justification.
I'd like to consider myself a reasonable person, and I can see no
reason to dismiss the justification in the Gettier case as
insufficient. One of his premises turned out to be wrong, but his
justification seems warranted.
André
Within this context you seem to prove insincere:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the job has
ten coins in their pocket."
Because everyone knows the truism that ten coins in
the pocket necessitates getting the job.
Nothing in his belief implied that getting ten coins would cause or
otherwise necessitate someone getting a job. His belief was that the
person who ended up getting the job would have ten coins in his
pocket. You've got your conditionals all mixed up.
André
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion in
the Gettier case.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between having
coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs to be. The question is simply whether there is (sufficient) justification for
holding that belief and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a
highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the justification in
this case is insufficient, you'll have to actually make that case, not
just rely on the fact that it runs counter to your intuitions, which is
what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case and
always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I think
there is a problem with the justification. The problem I have with the
case is that there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even
on the de re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion in
the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between having
coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs to be. The
question is simply whether there is (sufficient) justification for
holding that belief and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a
highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly
contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the
justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to actually
make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs counter to your
intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case and
always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I think
there is a problem with the justification. The problem I have with the
case is that there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a
definite description to a de dicto interpretation of that same
expression which I don't believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the
belief remains true even on the de re interpretation, so I'm not
convinced that this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion in
the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The Gettier
case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between having
coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs to be. The
question is simply whether there is (sufficient) justification for
holding that belief and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a
highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly
contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the
justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to actually
make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs counter to
your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case and
always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I think
there is a problem with the justification. The problem I have with
the case is that there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a
definite description to a de dicto interpretation of that same
expression which I don't believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the
belief remains true even on the de re interpretation, so I'm not
convinced that this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to follow
the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as sufficient justification.
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion
in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The Gettier
case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between having
coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs to be.
The question is simply whether there is (sufficient) justification
for holding that belief and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a
highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly
contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the
justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to actually
make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs counter to
your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case and
always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I think
there is a problem with the justification. The problem I have with
the case is that there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a
definite description to a de dicto interpretation of that same
expression which I don't believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the
belief remains true even on the de re interpretation, so I'm not
convinced that this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find it
counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to follow
the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced you fully
understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion
in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The Gettier
case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between
having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs
to be. The question is simply whether there is (sufficient)
justification for holding that belief and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a
highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly
contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the
justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to actually >>>>> make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs counter to
your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case and >>>>> always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I
think there is a problem with the justification. The problem I have >>>>> with the case is that there is a shift from a de re interpretation
of a definite description to a de dicto interpretation of that same >>>>> expression which I don't believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the
belief remains true even on the de re interpretation, so I'm not
convinced that this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find it
counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to
follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced you
fully understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you
disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent 60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that Jones will
get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with inferring that the person who will
get the job will have ten coins in their pocket.
The problem with the Gettier scenario isn't this inference. The problem
is that he initially interpets the definite description 'the one who
will get the job' as a de re expression. And if we treat it as a de re desciption then the Gettier problem poses absolutely no problems for the definition of knowledge as 'justified true belief'.
Where Gettier goes astray is that he relies on our intuitions (a
dangerous thing to do since intuitions can mislead) that the overall scenario (in which Smith is actually the one hired who just happens to
also have ten coins in his pocket) poses a problem for the JTB
definition of knowledge. But this *only* poses such a problem when the definite description 'the one who will get the job' is interpreted de
dicto rather than de re. His initial justification was predicated on a
de re reading which Gettier then subtly shifts to de dicto when he wants
our intuitions to see a problem with the example. If we maintain the de
re interpretation throughout then there is really no problem. Smith's
belief boils down to the belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, which is both true and perfectly justified given that he had counted the coins.
If you're not familiar with the de re/de dicto distinction you can read
the wikipedia page on it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re
André
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under discussion >>>>>> in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The Gettier
case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between
having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs >>>>>> to be. The question is simply whether there is (sufficient)
justification for holding that belief and I believe that there is. >>>>>>
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is a >>>>>> highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly
contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the
justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to
actually make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs
counter to your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case
and always have been, but not because it is contrived or because I >>>>>> think there is a problem with the justification. The problem I
have with the case is that there is a shift from a de re
interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto
interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe is
warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the de
re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid
objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find it
counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to
follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced you
fully understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you
disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the inference
reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent 60 yrs trying
to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that Jones
will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten coins in his
pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with inferring that the person
who will get the job will have ten coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
My auto insurance company raised my monthly auto insurance
rate $30 entirely on the basis that I applied for two credit
cards. I appealed it all the way to the state department
of insurance and lost.
The problem with the Gettier scenario isn't this inference. The
problem is that he initially interpets the definite description 'the
one who will get the job' as a de re expression. And if we treat it as
a de re desciption then the Gettier problem poses absolutely no
problems for the definition of knowledge as 'justified true belief'.
In philosophy, "de re" (Latin for "about the thing") refers to
statements or properties that apply directly to an object itself, independent of how that object is described.
Where Gettier goes astray is that he relies on our intuitions (a
dangerous thing to do since intuitions can mislead) that the overall
scenario (in which Smith is actually the one hired who just happens to
also have ten coins in his pocket) poses a problem for the JTB
definition of knowledge. But this *only* poses such a problem when the
definite description 'the one who will get the job' is interpreted de
dicto rather than de re. His initial justification was predicated on a
de re reading which Gettier then subtly shifts to de dicto when he
wants our intuitions to see a problem with the example. If we maintain
the de re interpretation throughout then there is really no problem.
Smith's belief boils down to the belief that Jones has ten coins in
his pocket, which is both true and perfectly justified given that he
had counted the coins.
If you're not familiar with the de re/de dicto distinction you can
read the wikipedia page on it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_dicto_and_de_re
André
You are using a bunch of convoluted Latin to try and
get away with hiding that fact that coins in pocket
never had an actual direct semantic connection to who
gets the job.
The only actual basis that he actually had was
what the president said.
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under
discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The
Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between
having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there needs >>>>>>> to be. The question is simply whether there is (sufficient)
justification for holding that belief and I believe that there is. >>>>>>>
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is >>>>>>> a highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly >>>>>>> contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the >>>>>>> justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to
actually make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs >>>>>>> counter to your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case >>>>>>> and always have been, but not because it is contrived or because >>>>>>> I think there is a problem with the justification. The problem I >>>>>>> have with the case is that there is a shift from a de re
interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto
interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe is >>>>>>> warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the de >>>>>>> re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid
objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find
it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to
follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced you >>>>> fully understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you
disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the inference
reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent 60 yrs trying
to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that Jones
will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten coins in his
pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with inferring that the
person who will get the job will have ten coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion "knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use without mistakes.
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under
discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The
Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between >>>>>>>> having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there
needs to be. The question is simply whether there is
(sufficient) justification for holding that belief and I believe >>>>>>>> that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it is >>>>>>>> a highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ highly >>>>>>>> contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue that the >>>>>>>> justification in this case is insufficient, you'll have to
actually make that case, not just rely on the fact that it runs >>>>>>>> counter to your intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing. >>>>>>>>
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case >>>>>>>> and always have been, but not because it is contrived or because >>>>>>>> I think there is a problem with the justification. The problem I >>>>>>>> have with the case is that there is a shift from a de re
interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto
interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe is >>>>>>>> warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the de >>>>>>>> re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid
objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find >>>>>> it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need to >>>>>> follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not convinced
you fully understand, not simply fall back on your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you
disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the
inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent 60
yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that Jones
will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten coins in his
pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with inferring that the
person who will get the job will have ten coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
Quit playing me for a chump!
On 2026-06-21 17:18, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under
discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The
Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between >>>>>>>>> having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there >>>>>>>>> needs to be. The question is simply whether there is
(sufficient) justification for holding that belief and I
believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it >>>>>>>>> is a highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ >>>>>>>>> highly contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue >>>>>>>>> that the justification in this case is insufficient, you'll >>>>>>>>> have to actually make that case, not just rely on the fact that >>>>>>>>> it runs counter to your intuitions, which is what you seem to >>>>>>>>> be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier case >>>>>>>>> and always have been, but not because it is contrived or
because I think there is a problem with the justification. The >>>>>>>>> problem I have with the case is that there is a shift from a de >>>>>>>>> re interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto
interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe is >>>>>>>>> warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the >>>>>>>>> de re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid >>>>>>>>> objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You find >>>>>>> it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You need >>>>>>> to follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not
convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on your
intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you
disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the
inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent
60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that Jones >>>>> will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten coins in
his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with inferring that the >>>>> person who will get the job will have ten coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
I never claimed it did. Perhaps if you'd actually *read* the explanation which I gave in my previous post (which you have disingenuously snipped) you'd understand.
Quit playing me for a chump!
No one is playing you for a chump. You simply have very poor reading comprehension skills and jump to a conclusion which was not what your interlocutor was actually claiming.
André
On 6/21/2026 7:00 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 17:18, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under
discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The
Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between >>>>>>>>>> having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there >>>>>>>>>> needs to be. The question is simply whether there is
(sufficient) justification for holding that belief and I
believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it >>>>>>>>>> is a highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ >>>>>>>>>> highly contrived examples to make points. If you want to argue >>>>>>>>>> that the justification in this case is insufficient, you'll >>>>>>>>>> have to actually make that case, not just rely on the fact >>>>>>>>>> that it runs counter to your intuitions, which is what you >>>>>>>>>> seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier >>>>>>>>>> case and always have been, but not because it is contrived or >>>>>>>>>> because I think there is a problem with the justification. The >>>>>>>>>> problem I have with the case is that there is a shift from a >>>>>>>>>> de re interpretation of a definite description to a de dicto >>>>>>>>>> interpretation of that same expression which I don't believe >>>>>>>>>> is warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on >>>>>>>>>> the de re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a >>>>>>>>>> valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You
find it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You >>>>>>>> need to follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not >>>>>>>> convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on your
intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as
sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you >>>>>> disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the
inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent >>>>>> 60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that
Jones will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten
coins in his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with
inferring that the person who will get the job will have ten coins >>>>>> in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
I never claimed it did. Perhaps if you'd actually *read* the
explanation which I gave in my previous post (which you have
disingenuously snipped) you'd understand.
Quit playing me for a chump!
No one is playing you for a chump. You simply have very poor reading
comprehension skills and jump to a conclusion which was not what your
interlocutor was actually claiming.
André
The first Gettier case assumes that a person
holds an unreasonable inference:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket."
When we toss that out the whole thing falls apart.
To use correct reasoning Smith holds the provably
insufficient belief that the company president's
opinion carries sufficient weight.
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H3
On 2026-06-21 18:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 7:00 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 17:18, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under >>>>>>>>>>> discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The >>>>>>>>> Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance between >>>>>>>>>>> having coins and getting a job. And there's no reason there >>>>>>>>>>> needs to be. The question is simply whether there is
(sufficient) justification for holding that belief and I >>>>>>>>>>> believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because it >>>>>>>>>>> is a highly contrived example. But philosophers often employ >>>>>>>>>>> highly contrived examples to make points. If you want to >>>>>>>>>>> argue that the justification in this case is insufficient, >>>>>>>>>>> you'll have to actually make that case, not just rely on the >>>>>>>>>>> fact that it runs counter to your intuitions, which is what >>>>>>>>>>> you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier >>>>>>>>>>> case and always have been, but not because it is contrived or >>>>>>>>>>> because I think there is a problem with the justification. >>>>>>>>>>> The problem I have with the case is that there is a shift >>>>>>>>>>> from a de re interpretation of a definite description to a de >>>>>>>>>>> dicto interpretation of that same expression which I don't >>>>>>>>>>> believe is warranted. Unfortunately, the belief remains true >>>>>>>>>>> even on the de re interpretation, so I'm not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>> this is a valid objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You >>>>>>>>> find it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. You >>>>>>>>> need to follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm not >>>>>>>>> convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on your >>>>>>>>> intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as >>>>>>>>> sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever you >>>>>>> disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow their
arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers the
inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have spent >>>>>>> 60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that
Jones will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten
coins in his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with
inferring that the person who will get the job will have ten
coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
I never claimed it did. Perhaps if you'd actually *read* the
explanation which I gave in my previous post (which you have
disingenuously snipped) you'd understand.
Quit playing me for a chump!
No one is playing you for a chump. You simply have very poor reading
comprehension skills and jump to a conclusion which was not what your
interlocutor was actually claiming.
André
The first Gettier case assumes that a person
holds an unreasonable inference:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket."
When we toss that out the whole thing falls apart.
To use correct reasoning Smith holds the provably
insufficient belief that the company president's
opinion carries sufficient weight.
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H3
Just a note here. I had not actually read the above link until now and
was instead relying on Gettier's original paper. The article above misrepresents Gettier, in that it says that "whoever will get the job
has ten coins in their pocket" but that wasn't Gettier's wording. He
said that "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket."
All my arguments were pertaining to Gettier's original formulation,
where a de_re-de_dicto ambiguity exists.
Gettier's argument revolves around the de_re-de_dicto distinction which
I laid out. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy obscures this fact
by changing Gettier's original wording. I agree with you that if you
take the wording in the article you linked to, the justification is not sufficient. But that wasn't Gettier's argument. It had not occurred to
me that the encyclopedia would have such a misrepresentation.
André
André
On 6/21/2026 7:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 18:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 7:00 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 17:18, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under >>>>>>>>>>>> discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The >>>>>>>>>> Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon
what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance >>>>>>>>>>>> between having coins and getting a job. And there's no >>>>>>>>>>>> reason there needs to be. The question is simply whether >>>>>>>>>>>> there is (sufficient) justification for holding that belief >>>>>>>>>>>> and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because >>>>>>>>>>>> it is a highly contrived example. But philosophers often >>>>>>>>>>>> employ highly contrived examples to make points. If you want >>>>>>>>>>>> to argue that the justification in this case is
insufficient, you'll have to actually make that case, not >>>>>>>>>>>> just rely on the fact that it runs counter to your
intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier >>>>>>>>>>>> case and always have been, but not because it is contrived >>>>>>>>>>>> or because I think there is a problem with the
justification. The problem I have with the case is that >>>>>>>>>>>> there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a definite >>>>>>>>>>>> description to a de dicto interpretation of that same >>>>>>>>>>>> expression which I don't believe is warranted.
Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the de re >>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid >>>>>>>>>>>> objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You >>>>>>>>>> find it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. >>>>>>>>>> You need to follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm >>>>>>>>>> not convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on >>>>>>>>>> your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as >>>>>>>>>> sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever >>>>>>>> you disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow
their arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers >>>>>>>> the inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have >>>>>>>> spent 60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that >>>>>>>> Jones will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten >>>>>>>> coins in his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with
inferring that the person who will get the job will have ten
coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
I never claimed it did. Perhaps if you'd actually *read* the
explanation which I gave in my previous post (which you have
disingenuously snipped) you'd understand.
Quit playing me for a chump!
No one is playing you for a chump. You simply have very poor reading
comprehension skills and jump to a conclusion which was not what
your interlocutor was actually claiming.
André
The first Gettier case assumes that a person
holds an unreasonable inference:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket."
When we toss that out the whole thing falls apart.
To use correct reasoning Smith holds the provably
insufficient belief that the company president's
opinion carries sufficient weight.
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H3
Just a note here. I had not actually read the above link until now and
was instead relying on Gettier's original paper. The article above
misrepresents Gettier, in that it says that "whoever will get the job
has ten coins in their pocket" but that wasn't Gettier's wording. He
said that "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket."
All my arguments were pertaining to Gettier's original formulation,
where a de_re-de_dicto ambiguity exists.
Gettier's argument revolves around the de_re-de_dicto distinction
which I laid out. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy obscures
this fact by changing Gettier's original wording. I agree with you
that if you take the wording in the article you linked to, the
justification is not sufficient. But that wasn't Gettier's argument.
It had not occurred to me that the encyclopedia would have such a
misrepresentation.
André
https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf
It is still the same fucking ten coins in pocket nonsense.
On 2026-06-21 18:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 7:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 18:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 7:00 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 17:18, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 15:48, olcott wrote:What the fuck is wrong with you?
On 6/21/2026 4:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 14:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 1:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 12:25, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 10:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-20 22:09, olcott wrote:
he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket.
That's not an inference; that's the actual belief under >>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion in the Gettier case.
That is a verbatim quote.
Yes. He makes an inference from which he forms a belief. The >>>>>>>>>>> Gettier case is concerned with the belief.
And it turns out to be true because he relied upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what turned out to be reasonable yet ultimately
incorrect testimony.
His reliance on the coins that have no semantic
relevance to getting the job itself was an
unreasonable divergence from correct reasoning.
The belief doesn't assert that there is any relevance >>>>>>>>>>>>> between having coins and getting a job. And there's no >>>>>>>>>>>>> reason there needs to be. The question is simply whether >>>>>>>>>>>>> there is (sufficient) justification for holding that belief >>>>>>>>>>>>> and I believe that there is.
I think you are hung up on the Gettier case simply because >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is a highly contrived example. But philosophers often >>>>>>>>>>>>> employ highly contrived examples to make points. If you >>>>>>>>>>>>> want to argue that the justification in this case is >>>>>>>>>>>>> insufficient, you'll have to actually make that case, not >>>>>>>>>>>>> just rely on the fact that it runs counter to your
intuitions, which is what you seem to be doing.
I should not that I am also uncomfortable with the Gettier >>>>>>>>>>>>> case and always have been, but not because it is contrived >>>>>>>>>>>>> or because I think there is a problem with the
justification. The problem I have with the case is that >>>>>>>>>>>>> there is a shift from a de re interpretation of a definite >>>>>>>>>>>>> description to a de dicto interpretation of that same >>>>>>>>>>>>> expression which I don't believe is warranted.
Unfortunately, the belief remains true even on the de re >>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretation, so I'm not convinced that this is a valid >>>>>>>>>>>>> objection to the Gettier example.
André
We change Knowledge is justified true belief to
Knowledge is sufficiently justified true belief.
But as I've said, he belief *is* sufficiently justified. You >>>>>>>>>>> find it counterintuitive, but intuitions can be misleading. >>>>>>>>>>> You need to follow the actual logic of the example, which I'm >>>>>>>>>>> not convinced you fully understand, not simply fall back on >>>>>>>>>>> your intuitions.
We then use the courts "reasonable person" standard
to define the degree of sufficient justification
required. Then all the Gettier cases fall apart.
And I maintain that a reasonable person would accept this as >>>>>>>>>>> sufficient justification.
You are stuck in rebuttal mode.
A reasonable person would not make the initial inference:
You keep accusing people of being in 'rebuttal mode' whenever >>>>>>>>> you disagree with them rather than actually trying to follow >>>>>>>>> their arguments. I'm certainly not the only one who considers >>>>>>>>> the inference reasonable. If I were, philosophers wouldn't have >>>>>>>>> spent 60 yrs trying to address this example.
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket." // direct quote
The initial inference is perfectly fine. He had evidence that >>>>>>>>> Jones will get the job and he has evidence that Jones has ten >>>>>>>>> coins in his pocket. There's therefore nothing wrong with
inferring that the person who will get the job will have ten >>>>>>>>> coins in their pocket.
It is ridiculous to link semantically unrelated items.
What "linkage" are you seeing here?
You know damned well that coins in the pocket
does not have one damn thing to do with getting a job.
I never claimed it did. Perhaps if you'd actually *read* the
explanation which I gave in my previous post (which you have
disingenuously snipped) you'd understand.
Quit playing me for a chump!
No one is playing you for a chump. You simply have very poor
reading comprehension skills and jump to a conclusion which was not >>>>> what your interlocutor was actually claiming.
André
The first Gettier case assumes that a person
holds an unreasonable inference:
"he proceeds to infer that whoever will get the
job has ten coins in their pocket."
When we toss that out the whole thing falls apart.
To use correct reasoning Smith holds the provably
insufficient belief that the company president's
opinion carries sufficient weight.
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H3
Just a note here. I had not actually read the above link until now
and was instead relying on Gettier's original paper. The article
above misrepresents Gettier, in that it says that "whoever will get
the job has ten coins in their pocket" but that wasn't Gettier's
wording. He said that "The man who will get the job has ten coins in
his pocket." All my arguments were pertaining to Gettier's original
formulation, where a de_re-de_dicto ambiguity exists.
Gettier's argument revolves around the de_re-de_dicto distinction
which I laid out. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy obscures
this fact by changing Gettier's original wording. I agree with you
that if you take the wording in the article you linked to, the
justification is not sufficient. But that wasn't Gettier's argument.
It had not occurred to me that the encyclopedia would have such a
misrepresentation.
André
https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf
It is still the same fucking ten coins in pocket nonsense.
No. It is very different because Gettier's wording is ambiguous. On a _de_re_ reading there is absolutely no reason to assume any relationship exists between getting a job and having coins.
If a car hits me while I am crossing the street and I tell the police
'the man who hit me was wearing a green tie', that certainly doesn't
imply any relationship between him hitting me and the fact that he was wearing a green tie. He didn't hit me because of his tie. But it is
still a perfectly reasonable thing to say.
You seem to be missing the entire point of this discussion. I am not
arguing in favour of Gettier's position. I am trying to more precisely
pin down where Gettier goes wrong. If I say 'the man who will get the
job has ten coins in his pocket', there's no implied relationship
between these two things *if* the definite expression is interpreted _de_re_. And, I believe, that that is how Gettier is initially
interpreting it.
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Once we have done that there is no reason to go back and
see every nit picky detail. I am a grande scheme of things
"big picture" kind of guy and totally unnecessary nit picky
details freak me the fuck out.
On 2026-06-21 19:36, olcott wrote:
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Once we have done that there is no reason to go back and
see every nit picky detail. I am a grande scheme of things
"big picture" kind of guy and totally unnecessary nit picky
details freak me the fuck out.
If nit picky details freak you out,
then you will never succeed in being
published academically, since any academic publisher will expect you to
go into all of the nit picky details of your proposal.
They will expect
you to provide explicit definitions of all your terms. They will expect
you to give fully fleshed out examples, rather than simply giving the
"big picture". If you're incapable of this, perhaps you should rethink
your goals.
André
On 6/21/2026 8:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 19:36, olcott wrote:
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Once we have done that there is no reason to go back and
see every nit picky detail. I am a grande scheme of things
"big picture" kind of guy and totally unnecessary nit picky
details freak me the fuck out.
If nit picky details freak you out,
That is you not paying attention
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
nit picky details
then you will never succeed in being published academically, since any
academic publisher will expect you to go into all of the nit picky
details of your proposal.
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Try to find a counter-example that I propose cannot possibly
exist. You seemed to have only dodged and weaved producing a
valid counter-example.
For the last 28 years it is been almost entirely
"I know for sure that you must be wrong because
I just don't believe you."
They will expect you to provide explicit definitions of all your
terms. They will expect you to give fully fleshed out examples, rather
than simply giving the "big picture". If you're incapable of this,
perhaps you should rethink your goals.
André
On 2026-06-21 19:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 8:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 19:36, olcott wrote:
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Once we have done that there is no reason to go back and
see every nit picky detail. I am a grande scheme of things
"big picture" kind of guy and totally unnecessary nit picky
details freak me the fuck out.
If nit picky details freak you out,
That is you not paying attention
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
nit picky details
What you may consider unnecessary others might consider extremely
necessary. Given that your grasp of most topics is exceedingly
simplistic I suspect you often don't grasp the importance of many of the
nit picky details.
André
On 2026-06-21 19:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 8:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-21 19:36, olcott wrote:
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently justified true
belief and use the court's "reasonable person" standard
to define what "sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated everything including Gettier cases.
Once we have done that there is no reason to go back and
see every nit picky detail. I am a grande scheme of things
"big picture" kind of guy and totally unnecessary nit picky
details freak me the fuck out.
If nit picky details freak you out,
That is you not paying attention
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
totally unnecessary
nit picky details
What you may consider unnecessary others might consider extremely
necessary. Given that your grasp of most topics is exceedingly
simplistic I suspect you often don't grasp the importance of many of the
nit picky details.
André
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
Blah, blah, and considerably more blah.
On and before 2026-06-22,
olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> and many others wrote:
Blah, blah, and considerably more blah.
Based on this exchange, philosophy seems an
extremely tedious contest to see who can publish
the most sentences that state whether or not
<one set of words> is/equals/means <another set
of words> - all in the context of the dubious
assumption that words can contain truth.
<rolls eyes while shaking head>
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use without >>> mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
On 6/22/2026 7:48 AM, oldernow wrote:
On and before 2026-06-22,
olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> and many others wrote:
Blah, blah, and considerably more blah.
Based on this exchange, philosophy seems an
extremely tedious contest to see who can publish
the most sentences that state whether or not
<one set of words> is/equals/means <another set
of words> - all in the context of the dubious
assumption that words can contain truth.
<rolls eyes while shaking head>
When we redefine knowledge as a sufficiently
justified true belief and use the court's
"reasonable person" standard to define what
"sufficiently justified" means then we have
categorically eliminated the Gettier cases.
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion >>>> "knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use
without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion >>>>> "knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to >>>>> have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use
without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the conclusion >>>>> "knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to >>>>> have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use
without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
On 6/23/2026 12:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the
conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to >>>>>> have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use
without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
I am not aware of any alternative solution to Gettier
where the judgement of human minds is involved that is
better than mine.
My augmentations to PTS approximate on infallibility
within the atomic base.
On 23/06/2026 17:26, olcott wrote:
On 6/23/2026 12:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the
conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples desire to >>>>>>> have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use >>>>>>> without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person". >>>>> And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
I am not aware of any alternative solution to Gettier
where the judgement of human minds is involved that is
better than mine.
Gettier is fairly unimportant. THe important problem is fo find an
algrithm to simulate a "reaonable person" as clisely as possibly.
My augmentations to PTS approximate on infallibility
within the atomic base.
No reason to think in does.
On 6/24/2026 3:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 23/06/2026 17:26, olcott wrote:
On 6/23/2026 12:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the
conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples
desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to use >>>>>>>> without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person". >>>>>> And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
I am not aware of any alternative solution to Gettier
where the judgement of human minds is involved that is
better than mine.
Gettier is fairly unimportant. THe important problem is fo find an
algrithm to simulate a "reaonable person" as clisely as possibly.
My augmentations to PTS approximate on infallibility
within the atomic base.
No reason to think in does.
Only because you don't even understand how PTS
differs from TCS.
In proof‑theoretic semantics an expression hasA consequnce of that restriction is that it often excludes what
semantic meaning only if there is a chain of
canonical inference steps from some atomic base
to that expression. If no such chain exists,
the expression does not inherit meaning from the base.
On 24/06/2026 22:31, olcott wrote:
On 6/24/2026 3:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 23/06/2026 17:26, olcott wrote:
On 6/23/2026 12:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the >>>>>>>>> conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples
desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to >>>>>>>>> use without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable person". >>>>>>> And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that.
None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
I am not aware of any alternative solution to Gettier
where the judgement of human minds is involved that is
better than mine.
Gettier is fairly unimportant. THe important problem is fo find an
algrithm to simulate a "reaonable person" as clisely as possibly.
My augmentations to PTS approximate on infallibility
within the atomic base.
No reason to think in does.
Only because you don't even understand how PTS
differs from TCS.
Irrelevant. Apparently you don't know how PTS differs from useful.
actually needed for solving some problem. For example, considerIn proof‑theoretic semantics an expression hasA consequnce of that restriction is that it often excludes what> is
semantic meaning only if there is a chain of
canonical inference steps from some atomic base
to that expression. If no such chain exists,
the expression does not inherit meaning from the base.
the calssical prblem of trisecting an angle. How does PTS help
with that?
On 6/25/2026 2:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 24/06/2026 22:31, olcott wrote:
On 6/24/2026 3:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 23/06/2026 17:26, olcott wrote:
On 6/23/2026 12:32 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 17:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/22/2026 2:30 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 22/06/2026 02:47, olcott wrote:None-the-less the Gettier cases are conquered.
On 6/21/2026 5:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 21/06/2026 03:41, olcott wrote:
Knowledge is not merely a justified true belief.
Knowledge is a sufficiently justified true belief such
that the justification is sufficient reason to conclude
that the belief is true. Copyright PL Olcott 2026
The problem is what justification is sufficient to call the >>>>>>>>>> conclusion
"knowledge". That problem is a consequence to some peoples >>>>>>>>>> desire to
have a word for a concept that is hard to define and hard to >>>>>>>>>> use without
mistakes.
When we use the court's "reasonable person"
standard we know that no reasonable person
would ever construe number of coins in the
pocket as having anything at all to do with
getting the job. (the first Gettier case)
https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/
On the other hand the company president's opinion
about who would be hired might be construed as a
sufficiently justified belief.
It is hard to construct a rule that simulates a "reasonable
person".
And also hard to test how well some proposed rule achieves that. >>>>>>>
Merely ad hoc solutions, no computable method.
I am not aware of any alternative solution to Gettier
where the judgement of human minds is involved that is
better than mine.
Gettier is fairly unimportant. THe important problem is fo find an
algrithm to simulate a "reaonable person" as clisely as possibly.
My augmentations to PTS approximate on infallibility
within the atomic base.
No reason to think in does.
Only because you don't even understand how PTS
differs from TCS.
Irrelevant. Apparently you don't know how PTS differs from useful.
*Proof Theoretic Semantics as a new Foundation*
*for Mathematics, Logic and the Theory of Computation*
Truth Conditional Semantics (TCS) <is> incoherent
compared to Proof Theoretic Semantics (PTS).
Essentially PTS just coherently connects the
semantic meanings expressed in language together
into one coherent body of general knowledge.
It does this without undecidability or mathematical
incompleteness.
https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCPTS-2.pdf
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